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Dedicated to all of you who are struggling with a challenging task 
If it feels tough, it means that you are probably learning something 
  
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the role of trial-based feedback on cognitive performance and motivation. We conducted 
behavioural tests in the laboratory, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate brain activation, 
and experimentally controlled tests in a non-lab environment; the classroom. In study I, we explored the effects 
of trial-based feedback in a working memory (WM) task. We used a factorial design so that we could study 
twelve different sequences that varied systematically in external and no external feedback on errors and correct 
responses. The feedback was delivered as brief sounds. We found that external feedback on errors did not impact 
on accuracy or reaction time (RT) in this test, which suggests a well-functioning internal error monitoring 
system. When external feedback was given on the first correct response after an error, we found reductions in 
performance accuracy. This implies that a sound given at this point may disturb the participants’ consolidation of 
strategy changes. When external feedback was given on all correct responses, participants responded more 
quickly. This was likely due to more information being extracted from the feedback about their responses being 
correct or incorrect, as revealed using information theoretical computations. As a result, performance accuracy 
decreased.  
In study II and III, we followed children’s WM training program in school. We started with a group of 112 
children randomised into one of four feedback groups; 1) feedback on correct responses; 2) feedback on 
incorrect responses; 3) no feedback and 4) feedback on correct and incorrect responses. The feedback was 
delivered as brief sounds as well as occasional verbal sentences. Out of the initially 112 recruited children, only 
53 completed ≥20 sessions of WM training. In study II, we investigated if intrinsic motivation and mindset 
regarding intelligence, contributed to the completion of ≥20 sessions of WM training, since mindset and intrinsic 
motivation has been suggested to influence motivation to continue with tasks. There was a significant difference 
in mindset scores between the children who performed ≥20 sessions of training and the children who did not. 
Mindset scores were lower in the group completing the training, meaning that these children to a greater extent 
viewed intelligence as something that can change with the help of training. Intrinsic motivation was measured by 
taking an average of seven chosen questions measuring motivation. A significant positive correlation was found 
between the motivation score and number of trained sessions. For example, we found that expectations of the 
training being fun and useful correlated positively with number of trained sessions. Since only half of the 
recruited participants completed ≥20 sessions of WM training, we recruited more participants to investigate the 
effects of trial-based feedback for study III.  
In study III, we recruited in total 177 children, of whom 133 performed ≥20 sessions of WM training. We 
investigated the effects of feedback on WM improvement, motivation and effort. We also used a new measure of 
effort as calculated from the number of trials the participants trained close to their max scores. We found an 
effect of feedback on WM improvement, where the least improvement was found in the group receiving 
feedback on both errors and corrects (Group 4). This effect of feedback on WM improvement was not mediated 
by effort. We found that high motivation and having high WM at the start had a positive impact on effort. This 
suggests that effort scores may be a good complement to measure motivation to train WM. Our results point 
towards a mechanism where trial-based feedback influences the performance monitoring system. 
Feedback related to a person’s trait has been shown to influence long-term development of an entity mindset, 
where intelligence is viewed as something that does not change with training. In study IV, we wanted to 
investigate if feedback in the form of praise related to a person’s trait (you are clever) and feedback related to a 
person’s action (your choice was correct) influenced performance improvements in a shorter perspective. Using 
fMRI, we measured brain activation patterns as a result of feedback type. This was a within-subject design 
where participants received both types of feedback at separate visits. We found that trait feedback, when 
compared to action feedback, reduced motivation, increased stress and impacted negatively on performance 
improvements. Caudate nucleus and medial prefrontal cortex were found to be more active in the trait condition. 
Interestingly, this effect was specific for more difficult trials that suggest that trait and task praise can impact on 
individuals’ task attention and level of uncertainty.  
In conclusion, adding to previous research regarding the contradictory effects of feedback, this thesis suggests 
that trial-based error-feedback does not interfere with a person’s internal feedback system, unless combined with 
positive feedback. Negative effects were found when the praise was related to trait or when positive feedback 
was given in excessive amounts, possibly interfering with the attentional resources needed for the task. Previous 
research on praise has found negative long-term effects of trait praise and here we found that it may also have 
immediate short-term effects.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 FEEDBACK 
Feedback has been found to be of great value for learning, but the effects of the feedback 
depend on type, timing, context and on the receiver (Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Therefore, 
even if the purpose of feedback is to inform a person about their performance, it does not 
always lead to improved performance. In this thesis, I investigate which type of trial based 
feedback that can be beneficial for performance. 
1.1.1 Feedback types 
Hattie & Timperley, (2007) divided feedback into four different types; 
1) Information about the correctness of something (Outcome feedback) 
2) Information about how something was done (Process feedback) 
3) Information about why one should continue or change (Regulatory feedback) 
4) Information about oneself (Person feedback) 
The first and the second type of feedback relate to the task, how to change strategy in order to 
improve. These types of feedback are concrete, whereas the third is related to encouragement 
on effort and the fourth about someone’s abilities or traits.  It is no surprise that these 
different types of feedback do not affect the individual in the same way. When the effects of 
feedback were to be summarised in a meta-analysis from 3000 papers, only 131 of them 
could be included due to differences in feedback type, amount, timing and about individual 
differences (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  
In this thesis, I look at outcome feedback after each trial e.g. the event being an error or 
correct response, and I use feedback from all of the above-mentioned types in the different 
studies. We use;  
1) Outcome feedback informing about being correct or not “Correct” (Study I, III, IV) 
2) Process feedback informing about an action “Your choice was correct” (Study IV) 
3) Regulatory encouraging feedback “Great, continue just like that” (Study III) 
4) Person feedback informing about being clever “You are clever” (Study IV) 
1.1.2 Origin of feedback  
The feedback can also be subdivided from their origin; 
1) Internal; if the information comes from within  
2) External; if the information comes from the surrounding  
There are studies demonstrating that the internal feedback monitoring system is effective for 
detecting errors in simple reaction time (RT) tasks (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Rabbitt & 
Rodgers, 1977). These studies found that participants know of their incorrect responses even 
when the participants’ were not given any external information about their mistakes. The 
reason for arguing that participants knew about their errors was established when the 
participants were successful in going back to correct their incorrect trials when given the 
chance. Later, internal error monitoring has been compared to the external system using 
brain-imaging analysis. The same brain area, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been found 
to be more activated after errors both when a person knows about their error themselves and 
when being externally informed (Holroyd et al., 2004). 
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1.1.3 Effect of feedback on performance 
Trial-based feedback have different effects when looking at the effects during compared to 
after the test (Goodman, 1998; Schmidt, Young, Swinnen, & Shapiro, 1989; Wade, 1974). 
Task feedback can help during the task of solving a puzzle whereas no external feedback 
(internal feedback) was found to be better for performance when solving a puzzle in the 
future Goodman (1998). The amount of feedback can influence performance, where both too 
much and too little feedback have been found to reduce performance in a decision making 
task (Lam, DeRue, Karam, & Hollenbeck, 2011; Schmidt et al., 1989). It is debated whether 
positive feedback is beneficial for performance or not (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Many people 
believe that positive feedback is always good for performance. Yet, scientific results show 
that for example praise regarding admiration directed to someone’s character has shown to 
have negative effects on performance (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). We need 
to find out more about the how valence of the feedback influence performance. The issue of 
feedback type given during a task is discussed in Study I, III and IV. 
1.2 ERRORS AND CORRECT RESPONSES 
1.2.1 Errors 
Errors can be divided into; slips and mistakes (Shalgi & Deouell, 2013). An example of a slip 
is when pressing the wrong button due to fast responding. People often know when these 
kinds of errors have occurred. An example of a mistake happens when a person thinks that 
they made a correct response, for example trying to spell a word for the first time and making 
a spelling mistake. In our first study we have looked at speeded response tasks where errors 
in the form of slips are common. These slips occur by accidentally pressing the wrong button 
caused by a lack of concentration. An individual can receive information from the outside 
regarding an error but can also monitor their performance through their own internal feedback 
system. For the slips, external information may not be essential whereas for mistakes it is. 
The task and the level of difficulty may therefore influence the effects of the feedback.  
1.2.2 Reaction time differences 
As it turns out, RT often differs depending on the event i.e. correct and incorrect response. A 
typical sign of that an error has occurred is the slowing following after the error (E+1) before 
making the next response (Laming, 1968; Rabbitt, 1969). The RT resulting in an error is 
often quick and the RT following two steps after an error (correct response after an error, 
CAE) (E+2) have been suggested to be slower than general correct responses (Laming, 1979; 
Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011).                                
These differences in RT in a sequential task, are illustrated in figure  1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Trials; errors, correct after errors and other corrects and their respective reaction times. 
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1.2.3 Post-error slowing 
The delay before responding which have been found to occur after errors (E+1 (Laming, 
1979; Rabbitt, 1966) is commonly referred to as the post-error slowing (PES).The reason 
behind this slowing that may occur after an errors is a much debated subject. The slowing has 
been suggested to occur due to a call for adjustment or a response caution in order to gain 
cognitive control (Dutilh et al., 2012; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2004). This proposal is supported by findings that post-error slowing lowers the probability 
of committing a subsequent error in the post-error trial (Danielmeier et al., 2011; Holroyd, 
Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005). However, others have failed to observe this relationship 
between post-error slowing and improved performance (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; 
Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977).  It has also been suggested that post-error slowing reflects the 
surprise of an outcome being rare (Notebaert et al., 2009). According to this argument, it is 
the infrequency of the error, rather than an error per se, that results in the slowing. These 
inconsistent findings is an ongoing debate about if slowing after an error cause better 
performance accuracy due to an adaptive control mechanism or if the slowing instead reflects 
a malfunctioning process (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993).  
1.2.4 Performance monitoring and brain activity 
Trying to measure what happens during errors has been studied extensively using a number 
of methods, for review see (Shalgi & Deouell, 2013). A common method to study the process 
occurring on and after errors is by using speeded response task paradigms such as the Eriksen 
Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). By using electroencephalogram (EEG) a negative 
deflection in the electrophysiological signal, an event related potentials (ERPs), was found to 
be enhanced following errors compared to correct response in speeded RT paradigms 
(Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). This signal was 
found around 50-100 ms after an error, and thus it was named error negativity (Falkenstein et 
al., 1991). Gehring et al., (1993) recorded from five electrode sites using the EEG and found 
that the Ne or the error related negativity, ERN, as they termed it, was strongest over the front 
and middle of the scalp. The region involved in error processing has later bee localized to the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994).  
When a person makes an error, anterior cingulate cortex is activated (Holroyd et al., 2004). 
When participants receive feedback on correct responses, activity in venral striatum has been 
found to increase whereas negative feedback on errors activates rostral cingulate motor area 
of the ACC, inferior anterior insula and epithalamus (habenular complex) (Ullsperger & Von 
Cramon, 2003). Furthermore, some studies have also indicated that the first correct response 
after an error differ from other correct responses seen in increased right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Kerns et al., 2004; King, Korb, Von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; Marco-
Pallarés, Camara, Münte, & Rodríguez-Fornells, 2008). We have further evidence supporting 
this difference from behavioural results in study I and from neuroimaging results from an 
fMRI study not included in this thesis. 
Besides ACC activity increase when an error has occurred, there are also other processes that 
increase due to the persons reaction to the error. For example, introspective emotional states 
which show increased activations in the insular cortex (Craig, 2009; Critchley, Wiens, 
Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004) has been shown to be more activated during errors 
compared to correct responses at certain conditions related to a person’s associations 
(Bengtsson, Dolan, & Passingham, 2011). Furthermore, the error may also evoke thoughts 
regarding ourselves which is reflected in increased medial prefrontal cortex activity 
(Bengtsson et al., 2011) an area often seen active when individuals self-reflect (Kelley et al., 
2002; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Ochsner et al., 2005). Self-
reflections may also occur when reflecting on correct responses and may differ depending on 
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feedback type, which turn could influence both performance and motivation, as we 
demonstrated in study IV. 
1.3 MOTIVATION 
When does a person show signs of motivation? Highly motivated individuals show 
enthusiasm, interest, curiosity and persist through challenges (Skinner & Belmont, 1993). 
Motivation involves both the belief and expectancy of being able to do a task and the factors 
involved in the will to perform the task, explained in the review by Eccles & Wigfield, 
(2002). For example, an individual who wants to become a singer, but does not want to take 
any action in trying to become one, is not a motivated person. However, if the individual 
wants to become a singer and believes in his/her capability to be able to achieve the goal 
(become a good singer) and act accordingly (start practicing etc.), is a motivated person. The 
concept of motivation should therefore include the will and actions of trying to peruse a goal.  
Expectations about one’s abilities are believed to influence motivation (Bandura, 1993). 
Bandura described two different kinds of beliefs that can influence goal setting and 
persistence on tasks. We can find out about these beliefs by answering two questions:   
1) Can one train to achieve this?  
2) Do I have what it takes to do that training?  
This first question defines if the person thinks that one can reach a certain goal via training. 
The second question describes the belief that the person themselves can do this training. 
Belief in one’s ability is defined as self-efficacy (Bandura, 1993). It has been shown that 
individuals who expect to do badly also perform worse compared to those that are optimistic 
(Marshall & Brown, 2004). Moreover, people with high self-efficacy tend to set high goals 
for themselves and they are also likely to commit strongly to these goals (Bandura, 1993). 
Zimmerman, (1990) defines persons who believe that they can perform and who find ways to 
master new skills self-regulated learners. At setbacks, a self-regulated learner takes 
responsibility for their actions and find out what is necessary, in order to overcome this 
obstacle. Motivation and its’ relation to feedback is investigated in study II, III and IV. 
1.3.1 Over-justification effect 
When external rewards are given focus can change away from the learning so that a person 
instead strive to receive a reward (Deci, 1971). In an early study showed that when monkeys 
solved a puzzle, they were found to do so for a longer time if they were not getting any 
reward (Harlow, 1950). The experimenter suggested that without reward the monkeys did the 
puzzle because it was fun. It has also been observed that when children are expecting to get a 
reward they show less intrinsic interest in the target activity compared to when they are not 
expecting a reward but receiving a reward, or when they are not expecting nor receiving any 
reward (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Another study showed that when students were 
asked to rate the main reason for learning, they chose grades to be the main reason and 
increasing one’s knowledge was rated as far less important, which is an example of external 
reward taking over the focus of the actual goal itself (Covington & Müeller, 2001). These 
examples reflect the over-justification effect. 
In the cases when no external reward is given, where does this intrinsic interest come from? It 
is argued that people get interested in something when they think about what they are able to 
achieve (Bandura, 1993). If so, an interest can arise in any area. This makes sense looking at 
children who often find any challenge that they think is possible to master to be fun.  With 
  11 
time, associations to a task and its positive outcomes will occur by classical conditioning i.e.  
a person is more likely to do something they have tried before and achieved, because it 
increase their self-efficacy (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002).  
When becoming skilful at something the fun may arise when being in a flow, which is 
described as ‘in a condition of high challenges and skills’ (Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 
1989). Furthermore, high focus is argued to occur when the task is on the right level of 
difficulty challenging the subject which is argued to shield against distractions (Halin, Marsh, 
Hellman, Hellström, & Sörqvist, 2014). In Study II, III and IV we investigated the effects of 
external feedback on motivation, performance and effort to understand if feedback can 
influence motivation, focus and persistence when performing a WM training program or a 
rule-switching task.  
1.3.2 Uncertainty and motivation 
It is essential to understand what is right and wrong while learning. If there are no indications 
of the consequences of an action, the individual has to guess whether it was a good or bad 
move. On the contrary, if external information is given about the outcome, the learning 
process of the task rule becomes much easier.  
In a review by Schultz, (2006), he describes experiments on learning starting already early 
1900 with Pavlov’s conditioning experiments. Pavlov was trying to better understand 
learning by associations of a stimulus and its’ upcoming outcome. In Pavlov’s experiment, 
they taught a dog to associate the sound of a bell with receiving food. The unconditioned 
stimulus (the bell) is not in itself rewarding, but after several training sessions where the bell 
proceeded the upcoming reward (food), the dog started to salivate (anticipate), already when 
hearing the bell. Similarly, during the same time period Thorndike described the addictive 
effect of rewards, which encourages a person to behave in the way that was rewarded (The 
Law of Effect). Skinner termed this strengthening of behaviours by giving positive rewards, 
reinforcements and that punishments or removal of rewards work as punishers. This led to the 
understanding that rewards can be predicted, which makes dopamine neurons fire (Schultz, 
Dayan, & Montague, 1997). The difference between the expected reward and the actual 
reward received is termed the prediction error. Predictions influence the surprise when 
receiving the reward in a positive or negative direction depending on the accuracy of the 
prediction (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000).  
Once having learned the task rules, doubt regarding one’s capacity can still vary between 
individuals and the way feedback is perceived will differ. The experience of feedback can be 
rewarding, annoying or redundant, depending on the individual’s level of confidence. Some 
people rely much more on their own acquired capacity, making them more confident while 
others may feel the need of further guidance e.g. external information, to become certain of 
their choices (Butler & Winne, 1995). These differences between people may relate to the 
persons own concept of learning. It is also possible that within an individual, these 
differences can appear by changing the type of feedback. In study IV, we investigate if we 
could evoke differences in the feelings of uncertainty by using two types of trial-by-trial 
feedback.  
1.3.3 Beliefs about intelligence  
How people approach a task and whether they persist or give up can depend on their way of 
thinking about learning and their goals, which we studied in a WM training program (Study 
II, III and IV). Some people set up goals regarding learning, to increase their ego and to look 
smart, linked to the extrinsic reward of being highly respected. Others set up the learning 
goals related to being able to master something.  These two types of reasons to learn can be 
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defined as self-involving or task-improvement (Ames, 1992). Ames, described that self-
involvement nourishes behaviour of outperforming others “to look good” whereas task-goals 
make children pick more challenging tasks. A number of studies focused on how peoples 
view intelligence and which effect these different views have on motivation and performance 
monitoring (Grant & Dweck, 2003; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). Dweck, (1986) 
have described two mindsets regarding intelligence; an entity mindset (fixed view) and an 
incremental mindset (growth view). An entity mindset is when a person believes that 
intelligence is something fixed and unchangeable. With an incremental mindset on the other 
hand, intelligence is believed to be something that can vary with effort and training.  
Students who view intelligence as something changeable have been found to be happier of 
their academic progress and obtain higher grades compared to control groups (Aronson, 
Fried, & Good, 2002). The way people think about intelligence has also been found to 
influence math grades in adolescent people (Blackwell et al., 2007).  A growth mindset has 
been found to lead to increased math grades in adolescents whereas people with an entity 
mindset have a more flat trajectory in math grades (Blackwell et al., 2007). With an entity 
mindset children have been found to report lower levels of comprehension after reading 
incoherent texts compared to people with an incremental mindset (Miele & Molden, 2010).  
Differences in neural activity in response to errors have been found to depend on mindset 
where entity theorists exhibited enhanced anterior frontal response (P3) to performance 
relevant feedback on errors compared to incremental theorists (Mangels et al., 2006). The P3-
peak was anterior to the mid-ACC, which is an area generally seen active during error 
monitoring. This suggests that entity theorists activate a stronger error monitoring response 
and that we do monitor our performance differently depending on thoughts and expectations 
about our abilities. 
1.3.4 The origin of mindsets  
Studies show that the origin of a person’s mindset develops through long-term exposure of 
feedback (Gunderson et al., 2013). They investigated how different types of positive feedback 
influenced the children’s way of thinking about learning later on in their lives. Children who 
received positive feedback related to a process such as; “you have done a great job”, has been 
associated with the increased likelihood of development of an incremental mindset. Another 
study also showed that feedback regarding making a good job with something rather than 
praising someone’s character was found to induce a more mastery oriented mindset (Zentall 
& Morris, 2010). 
With an incremental mindset setbacks are viewed upon as challenges (Dweck, 2002; 
Gunderson et al., 2013). Conversely, receiving feedback about one’s traits such as “you are 
so smart” is associated with development of a fixed orientation. With a fixed orientation, 
people tend to believe that failures are due to your own inadequacy, can lead to increased 
helpless behaviour and avoidance of challenges and they have also been found to be more 
depressed than people with a growth view. People with a growth mindset think that they can 
improve after a setback with effort and that the skill can be acquired. 
In Gunderson et al., (2013) they investigated the amount and type of feedback when parents 
talked to their children while playing with them during 90 minute sessions, when the child 
was 14, 26 and 38 months old. Indeed, children who received a lot of process praise were at 
the age of 7-8 having a more incremental oriented mindset. This suggests that long-term 
exposure to feedback influence later mindset and motivation. In this American study they 
could also distinguish between which type of praise the parents gave depending on if their 
child was a girl or a boy, where girls got more person praise while boys received more 
process praise, which later influenced their view on intelligence and their motivation and 
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ability beliefs (Gunderson et al., 2013). In our study IV we have looked into the type of 
feedback (person and process feedback) to investigate if there are also instant differences 
affecting our behaviour. 
1.3.5 The effect of expectations 
People tend to match their expectations to their abilities (Marshall & Brown, 2004). For 
example, individuals with low expectations ascribe poor performance to their abilities 
whereas people with high expectations take more credit for high performance. There have 
been number of studies on monkeys reward system when learning how to perform tasks 
(Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Schultz, 1998; Wolfram Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). 
To study reward, the dopamine system is first measured before learning, just by presenting 
the reward and later measurements of increases or decreases in dopamine neuron activity can 
be studied. When monkeys learn to associate a stimulus with a reward in a conditioning 
experiment they learn the positive consequences of an action and hence starts anticipating the 
reward already before it happens. Thus when an outcome is better than expected dopamine 
neurons fire, but when an outcome is as good as expected and when the outcome is worse 
than expected, dopamine firing decrease (Schultz, 1998). These findings showed a difference 
between what is expected and what is later received. This effect is termed; the prediction 
error and have been of great use for later studies on expectations and learning (Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000). As discussed by Berridge, (2007) the role of dopamine may particularly be 
involved in the wanting a reward.  
1.3.6 Effort 
We were interested in understanding the relationship between effort and motivation from a 
behavioural perspective and therefore we extracted a score measuring effort in study III. 
Animal studies suggest that effort can vary between subjects (mice) depending on 
expressions of dopamine receptor (DR2) in the striatum, which then influence motivation 
(Trifilieff et al., 2013). An over-expression of postsynaptic D2Rs in the nucleus accumbens 
increased the willingness to use effort to obtain a goal (motivation) as tested in an congenic 
mouse models (Trifilieff et al., 2013). In this experiment, pressing a lever to get more 
attractive food demands more effort than just grabbing less attractive food available, and rats 
treated with low doses of dopamine antagonists, or mice with mesoaccumbens dopamine 
depletion chose the less attractive food over the effort of pressing the lever for better food. 
This indicates that there is a relationship between dopamine levels and motivation to induce 
effort (Trifilieff et al., 2013). In study III and IV, we have not been looking at dopamine 
receptors, but we do test if we by the use of feedback can change effort and if feedback 
influences motivation to continue with a task. 
1.3.7 Self-esteem 
Self-esteem is a subjective opinion of one’s abilities answering how much a person value 
themselves (Baumeister et al., 2003). Explicit measures of self-esteem rely in self-ratings, and 
with that come a problem with reliability. People generally want to rate themselves 
positively, the average self-esteem in a sample often lies above the midpoint (Baumeister, 
Tice, & Hutton, 1989). Furthermore, the subjective measure does not have to cohere with an 
objective measure of a person’s ability. There are a number of questionnaires designed to 
measure self-esteem. In study IV we used Rosenberg’s global self-esteem measure 
(Rosenberg, 1965). These two questionnaires measure domain specific and global self-
esteem. Global self-esteem is a general self-esteem measure of a sense of being worthy. 
Domain specific self-esteem on the other hand measures the subjective worthiness in 
different areas such as social, physical appearance, physical abilities or school related abilities 
where people may rate themselves differently.  
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The causality of performance and high self-esteem is complex. In a meta-analysis of 128 
studies on self-esteem found a weak positive correlation between performance and self-
esteem (Hansford & Hattie, 1982). A confident view of one’s abilities is believed to be linked 
to persistence when facing difficulties (McFarlin, 1985). McFarlin found that participants 
with high self-esteem take tips or cues into great account and tend to decide for themselves if 
it was a good idea to continue or give up with a task. Low self-esteem individuals have been 
found to make more use of direct instructions where they were told to continue or stop. It is 
possible that high self-esteem individuals can rely on their own judgment whereas low self-
esteem individuals need more guidance in line with (Butler & Winne, 1995).  
Self-esteem can also have negative consequences when related to results known as 
achievement-based self-esteem, where only results define the self-esteem. This type of self-
esteem is transient and is only kept by performing well. Failure on the other hand forces a 
person with performance based self-esteem to re-evaluate themselves and their ability, which 
may cause emotional distress and leading to avoidance of trying again (Crocker, Brook, 
Niiya, & Villacorta, 2006; Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; Hallsten, 
Rudman, & Gustavsson, 2012). Having this type of self-esteem can result in burn-out effects, 
which gives further support of the negative consequences of a heightened self-view (Dahlin, 
Joneborg, & Runeson, 2007). 
Externally provided feedback may be beneficial when there is more insecurity or less self-
efficacy, such as relying in one’s own ability to be able to solve a task. In Study II and III, we 
wanted to investigate how beliefs regarding one’s abilities and feedback influenced 
persistence and in Study IV, we test correlations of mood scores and self-esteem scores with 
performance and motivation. 
1.4 COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE 
1.4.1 Working memory  
Working memory (WM) is the ability to remember and use information for a short period of 
time where simultaneous storage and processing of information is required (Baddeley, 1992). 
WM capacity is highly related to ability to sustain attention and is a predictor of academic 
performance (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Bull, Espy, & Wiebe, 2008; Gathercole, Brown, & 
Pickering, 2003).  There are a number of ways to test WM capacity, such as visual and spatial 
WM tasks. These tasks involve placement of an object in space at one time (Luck & Vogel, 
1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001), verbal tasks such as remembrance of  letters (Braver 
et al., 1997), recall of numbers (Babcock & Salthouse, 1990), recall of words (Chein & Fiez, 
2001) or reading tasks (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).  
One popular WM task is the n-back tasks in which the participant is instructed to try to 
remember when an item has been previously presented n steps earlier or not, for review see 
(Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005). In study I, we used a 2-back task with letters to 
see how external feedback (sounds) on correct and/or errors during different parts of this task 
influenced the accuracy. 
1.4.2 Working memory training 
The importance of WM for every-day functioning and academic performance has motivated 
research for developing methods to improve WM capacity with non-pharmacological 
interventions, such as computerized training programs, for review see (Peijnenborgh, Hurks, 
Aldenkamp, Vles, & Hendriksen, 2015; Spencer-Smith & Klingberg, 2015).  
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In study II and III we used Cogmed’s WM training programs consisting of both visuospatial 
and verbal tasks (Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002). The software used, Cogmed’s 
RM (Cogmed and Cogmed Working Memory Training, are trademarks in the U.S. and/or 
other countries, of Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliate(s)). A key component of the 
software is the individualized adjustment of the difficulty levels. This means that participants 
will perform highly demanding levels if they try their best to improve and thus the training 
will involve making a large proportion of errors.  This makes adaptive WM training suitable 
for studying motivational aspects of how long a person is willing to continue when the task is 
tough. From a practical perspective, it can be problematic that the training is so tough. Large 
dropouts lead to studies with smaller sample sizes and the practical issue of having to recruit 
a larger proportion of participants. In a study with similar set by Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Shah, 
and Jonides, 2014) participants were to perform 20 sessions where each session was about 90 
minutes of WM training, which is similar to the setup of Study I and II. In their study, the 
authors reported the number of participants who did not complete the protocol finding that 
only 44% of the recruited children managed to perform 20 sessions. 
1.4.3 Rule switching task 
In study IV we use a rule switching tasks used to study behavioural adjustments when task 
rules changed from one rule in a task to another which is reflected in differences in reaction 
time (Monsell, 2003).  We used a particular type of rule switching task where a cue is shown 
that indicate a particular rule which can be more or less easy (bivalent or univalent rule) used 
in previous studies (Bengtsson and Penny, 2013; Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, 
& Bunge, 2006; Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006). This task is further described 
in the method section. This task was in our study not aimed to investigate the switch but to 
investigate different feedback effects on univalent and bivalent rules. 
1.4.4 Cognitive control and distractions 
A susceptibility to give in by external cues can result in over-eating, alcohol consumption, 
violence, drug abuse among many other things and is extensively studied because of its major 
consequences both for the individual and its’ surrounding (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). 
The ability to self-regulate is depending on the recourses available and can be reduced by 
sleep deprivation (Alhola & Polo-Kantola, 2007) and distractions such as sounds (Halin et al., 
2014).  
When engaging in the cognitive task with great focus both external and internal side-tracks 
can obstruct the focus, which is why it is important for us to be able to control this. For 
example, thoughts about your ability or having a fear of negative evaluations have been found 
to influence your task-behaviour which was in this case evoked by external evaluation (Van 
der Molen et al., 2013). Participants with a strong fear of being negatively evaluated was 
found to have an increased slowing in reaction time when responding to how others would 
judge them (Van der Molen et al., 2013). This slowing in reaction time to be able to make a 
correct response, is argued to be due to fewer resources left, when ruminating (Guinote, 
2007). Distracting sounds can grasp attention especially when the sound change in a sequence 
as described by Sörqvist et al., (2012). Distraction can also depend on the will to engage in a 
task, which can be related to the difficulty of the task as described in Halin et al., (2014). 
They used a text that was easy to read and found that background speech influenced the 
recalling of the text negatively. This was however not found for texts that were more difficult 
to read due to changed font size. The authors argue that higher task-engagement in a more 
difficult task shield against distractions. While there have been a few studies investigating the 
distraction of irrelevant sounds, we have looked at different task relevant sounds that indicate 
a person’s outcome. 
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2 AIMS  
 
The overall aim of the thesis was to investigate effects of internal and external trial-based 
feedback on errors and correct responses and action or trait related praise. 
Study I 
The aim of Study I was to investigate the effect of feedback (external/internal) on errors, 
correct after errors and general correct responses on cognitive performance accuracy and 
reaction time in a WM task. 
Study II 
The aim of Study II was to investigate if a person’s thoughts regarding intelligence (a 
person’s growth mindset) and their intrinsic motivation as measured by questionnaires 
influenced the number of days trained in a WM training program. 
Study III 
The aim of Study III was to investigate the effects of different types of feedback on errors and 
correct responses on WM training improvement and motivation and to evaluate a new 
measure of effort. 
Study IV 
The aim of Study IV was to investigate how positive feedback directed to someone’s trait; 
being smart or someone’s action; choosing correctly, influence brain activation, performance 
and motivation during a rule-switching task. 
3 METHODS 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS AND ETHICS 
In study I and IV we recruited healthy participants by advertisements in Stockholm. In study 
I, we recruited 63 participants of which 60 participated in the study, 43 females, mean age 
26.8 ± 5.1. In Study IV, we recruited 22 participants of which 20 participants were included 
in the study, 8 female, mean age 24.0 ± 5.6. All participants were fluent in either Swedish or 
English.  None of the participants in the analysed material had any neurological conditions. 
However, participants who were found to have neurological abnormalities were excluded 
from the analysis. In study II, we recruited from 112 children, 54 girls, mean age 13 ±0.6 
from schools in Stockholm. In Study III, 177 participants were recruited, mean age 13.8 ± 1.3 
years old, 93 boys.  
All participants decided themselves that they wanted to partake in the studies. They all signed 
a written informed consent. This consent for study I and IV stated that the participant could 
terminate the experiment at any given time without the need to give any reason for it and that 
the name of all participants would be coded. The consent also stated that the information 
collected were only to be used for research purpose by researchers at the Karolinska Institute. 
Participants were well informed about all parts of the experiment before starting and agreeing 
to participate.  
The participants knew about the experimental procedure, the scanning procedure as well as 
the decoding of their names, before signing the consent form. In study IV, the MR-procedure 
started with information by email followed by a conversation on the phone some days prior to 
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the visit. All participants answered the screening questions in written form. The screening 
were used to exclude participants so we only included participants who were; right-handed, 
healthy (no neurological or other medical condition), non-pregnant, participants who had not 
performed any heart or brain surgery, who had not performed a similar experiments before, 
who did not have a pacemaker, metal clips, shunts, port-a-chat, prosthesis, pumps or any kind 
of metal in their bodies. We excluded participants who reported claustrophobia and 
prescribed medication. In study II and study III, which was a part of collaboration with 
Cogmed (www.cogmed.com), also involved employers at Cogmed. They were to take part in 
the data collection and analysis and here the parents to the children were signing the 
agreement to participation of these studies.  
3.2 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
There are no conflicts of interest to report in study I or VI. The studies II and study III were 
made in collaboration with Cogmed (Cogmed, Pearson Assessments). Stina Söderqvist and 
Sissela Bergman Nutley are employed at Pearson Assessments who distributes Cogmed’s 
WM training program. They both declare that the research was conducted in the absence of 
any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of 
interest.  
3.3 TASKS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In study I, we used a 2-back task with letters as stimuli. This WM task is widely used to test 
the ability to maintain information across a delay (Cohen JD, MacWhinney B, Flatt MR, 
1993). White letters were presented centrally on a black computer screen, one letter at the 
time (Figure 2). If the letter they saw also appeared two letters back the participant made a 
“yes” response, otherwise they made a “no” response. The “yes” response was made by 
pressing the button corresponding to the right index finger, while pressing the button 
corresponding to their right middle finger, on the computer keyboard, made a “no” response. 
The same letter, regardless if written as capital letter or lowercase letter, was regarded a 
match. Both capital and lowercase letters were used in the sequences to reduce the possibility 
that participants solely relied on visual memory. A sequence had 30% hits (“yes” responses). 
 
Figure 2) 2-back task with letter  
In study II and III we used Cogmeds WM program which is based on previous training 
programs (Klingberg et al., 2005). The software used was Cogmed’s RM (Cogmed and 
Cogmed Working Memory Training are trademarks, in the U.S. and/or other countries, of 
Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliate(s)), consists of visuo-spatial and verbal WM tasks. The 
tasks involved memory of both the location and the order of which the stimuli were presented 
and responses were made by clicking/tapping on the items one at a time in the order they 
were presented or in the reversed order, for an illustration of one of their tasks (figure 3). 
Task difficulty was adjusted so that difficulty levels (the number of stimuli to-be-
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remembered) increased following a correct response and decreased following an incorrect 
response. This way the participants always trained on a challenging level. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Press on the circles that blink in the correct order. In this illustrative picture, the circles that have 
blinked have been numbered in the order they blinked which is how the participant later should recall them. 
In Study IV we used a rule-switching task (Figure 4). In this task previously used by Crone et 
al., (2006), the participants responded to symbols that could be either univalent or bivalent by 
pressing the left or right button on a button box. The univalent trials were associated with 
fixed responses, e.g. when a symbol of a bow (rule symbol) is followed by a house (response 
symbol) a left key press is the correct answer, whereas a right key-press is correct when a 
bow is followed by a car (Fig. 4a). Bivalent trials refer to visual pictures that were associated 
with different responses depending on one of the two rules possible. For example, if a rule 
symbol consisting of a square is followed by the response symbol of a butterfly, the 
participants should press the left button. On the other hand, if the rule symbol is a triangle and 
is followed by the same response symbol, a butterfly, the participant should press the right 
button (Fig. 4bc). 
 
Figure 4abc. Rule-switching task with univalent and bivalent rules 
3.3.1 Task setup 
In our study I, II and III we are interested in looking at errors and correct responses. In Study 
I we depicted the events as follows; errors (E), a correct response after an error (CAE) which 
is the correct response that a participant makes when just previously having made an error 
(E+1) and general correct (GC) responses which are the correct responses that follow more 
than 2 steps after an error (E+2, E+3. E+4…) (Figure 5). 
3                                4                                
1                                
5                                
2                                
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Figure 5. General corrects (GC) responses, errors (E) and correct after errors (CAE). 
To indicate the outcome of the responses we used sounds as external feedback. When no 
sound was used the participant had to rely on their internal feedback system. Sound could be 
delivered on errors (E), on correct after errors (CAE) and on general correct (GC) responses. 
A dark sound 74 Hz beep (55ms) indicated an error and a bright sound 740 Hz (55ms) 
indicated a correct response. In the figures 6, a sound is illustrated with a grey coloured 
square and no sound with a white square. In study I we wanted to analyse all possible 
combinations of sound or no sound (external or internal feedback) on the three events (E, 
CAE and GC), which results in eight individual sequences. Thus, each sequence include 
information about sound or no sound in these three events; E, CAE, GC. This is depicted [x y 
z] where the x represents errors, y, represents correct after errors and z represents general 
corrects [E ,CAE, GC]. For the script where we analysed the data we uses numbers as codes; 
1 for sound and 0 for no sound. For example, in sequence [000] there is no sound in either of 
these events. In [010] the participants get no sound on errors, sound on correct after errors 
(CAE) and no sound on general correct (GC). With this in mind, we can combine sound or no 
sound so that we receive eight different sequences with either sound or no sound on each of 
the three events [E,CAE,GC], [0/1, 0/1, 0/1]. 
E                   
 sound 
CAE                   
 no sound 
GC                
 [000] [001] [010] [011] [100] [101] [110] [111] 
Figure 6. The eight individual sequences, which participants were to perform. Dark square indicate sound and 
white square indicate no sound. 
However, in Study I, we used this design where we also varied the amount of sounds on the 
general correct responses, resulting in twelve different sequence combinations. On general 
corrects (GC) we had either no sound, sound on all or sound on 20% of the general correct 
responses.  In figure 7, no sound is displayed by white, sound on 20% of general corrects is 
displayed by light grey and sound on all is displayed by dark grey.  
To analyse the effects of the twelve sequences we decided to use a 2x2x3 design, with a 
custom made script for Matlab. Errors could have no sound (0) or sound (1), CAE can have 
no sound (0) or sound (1) and GC can have no sound (0), sound on 20% of the general 
corrects (1), or sound on all general corrects (2). We use the following notation for E, CAE 
and GC [0/1, 0/1, 0/1/2]. This way we could analyse the main effects of sound on E, CAE and 
GC. The twelve sequences we used in the WM task are displayed below in figure 7. 
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E                         
CAE                         
GC                         
 [000] [001] [002] [010] [011] [012] [100] [101] [102] [110] [111] [112] 
Figure 7. The twelve sequences with external feedback (sounds) given on errors 
(E), correct after errors (CAE) and general corrects responses (GC) and the 
different amount of external feedback on GC (0, 20% and 100%). 
 
For study III, the different types of feedback are outlined in figure 8. Four groups who 
received different combinations of auditory feedback were compared. Group 1 (positive) 
received a two-tone positive sound on each correct response, a neutral click sound on each 
incorrect response and occasional verbal feedback sentences for example “well done”, 
following correct trials. Group 2 (negative) received a descending sound for each incorrect 
response, a neutral click sound on each correct response and encouraging occasional verbal 
feedback such as “that was close”, following occasional  incorrect trials. Group 3 (none) 
received a neutral click sound on each correct and each incorrect response and no verbal 
feedback phrases. Group 4 (combination) received a two-tone positive sound on each correct 
response and a descending sound for each incorrect response and occasional verbal feedback 
sentences related to correct and incorrect performance. The total amount of verbal feedback 
given was balanced between the groups except for the group without feedback. 
Feedback groups 1 2 3 4 
Corrects two-tone sounds sound Click click sound 
Errors descending sound click Sound click sound 
Comments regarding 
corrects 
Well done   Well done 
Comments regarding errors   
That was 
close 
  
That was 
close  
Figure 8. Feedback groups in study II and III with sounds on correct or errors and feedback comments on correct 
and errors, or no comments or neutral click sounds. 
In the fMRI study (study IV) we used a factorial design function where we set up a design 
with 2 factors with 2 levels each.  Our first factor is feedback where we had task (1) or trait 
(2) feedback. Our second factor is time, where we have time point 1 and 2. Time point 1 was 
the feedback session (FS) and time point 2 was the no feedback session (NFS). This results in 
a 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA with the factors feedback (task/trait) and time (FS/NFS) 
(Figure 9). 
      
0% 20% 100% 
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  Session 
  FS (1) NFS (2) 
Trait   
You are clever (1) 
11 12 
Task  
Your choice was 
correct 
(2) 
21 22 
Figure 9. Task feedback, Feedback Session (FS) (11), Task feedback, No Feedback Session (NFS) (12), Trait 
feedback, Feedback Session (FS) (21), Trait feedback, No Feedback Session (NFS) (22) 
3.3.2 Questionnaires 
In study II, III and IV we also used participants own subjective ratings. In Study IV a 
minimum of one day before the experiment all participants filled in the following 
questionnaires using Google forms; Burns depression inventory (Burns, 1989), Rosenberg 
self-esteem score (Rosenberg, 1979). These questionnaires measure mood (depression) and 
global self-esteem scores. During three occasions before each scanning session the 
participants rated their motivation, stress, and task difficulty by answering three questions 
asked by the experimenter; How motivated are you to continue with the task?; How stressed 
do you feel right now?; How difficult did you find the task? Ratings were of 1-10; 1-very 
calm/unmotivated/easy, 10-very stressed/motivated/difficult. The questions were asked 
before the cognitive task, after FS, and after NFS (difficulty ratings were not given before the 
task). After the experiment, the participants wrote down how they experienced the feedback 
during the different sessions with the questions; what did you think about the test with 
feedback? What did you think about the test without feedback? They were subsequently 
debriefed about the purpose of the experiment. In study II and III participants answered six 
selected questions from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI) (McAuley, Duncan, & 
Tammen, 1989) and one in-house question on the first day of their training. The questions 
were in the field of enjoyment, competence and effort and were translated into Swedish. 
Additionally, all participants answered three theory of intelligence (TOI) questions (Dweck, 
Chiu, & Hong, 1995). The questions below are used in study II, III and IV.  
Motivation and mindset questions 
Motivation Q1. I believe the training will be good for me 
Motivation Q2. I believe that I will be pretty good at this type of training 
Motivation Q3. I will put effort into the training 
Motivation Q4. I believe the training will be challenging 
Motivation Q5. I believe the training will be fun 
Motivation Q6. It is important for me to do well on this training 
Motivation Q7*. I believe I will go through with all of the training sessions 
Mindset 1. You have a certain amount of intelligence and you can’t do much to change it. 
Mindset 2. Your intelligence is something that you can’t change very much. 
Mindset 3. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence. 
 
*Motivation question 7 was not delivered after the test and not analyzed in average 
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Burns depression inventory  
Answer how much you have experienced what is stated. 
You should think of your experience during last 7 days, including today. 
1. Feeling sad or down in the dumps  
2. Feeling unhappy or blue  
3. Crying spells or tearfulness  
4. Feeling discouraged  
5. Feeling hopeless  
6. Low self-esteem  
7. Feeling worthless or inadequate  
8. Guilt or shame  
9. Criticizing yourself or blaming others  
10. Difficulty making decisions  
11. Loss of interest in family, friends or colleagues  
12. Loneliness  
13. Spending less time with family or friend  
14. Loss of motivation  
15. Loss of interest in work or other activities  
16. Avoiding work or other activities  
17. Loss of pleasure or satisfaction in life  
18. Feeling tired  
19. Difficulty sleeping or sleeping too much  
20. Decreased or increased appetite  
21. Loss of interest in sex  
22. Worrying about your health  
  
Rosenberg self-esteem score  
These questions relate to your opinion about yourself. 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.  
2. At times, I think I am no good at all. * 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.  
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.  
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. * 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. * 
7. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.  
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. * 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. * 
* Reverse this question 
3.3.3 Measure of uncertainty  
Shannon & Weaver (1963), describe a theory of which we can get measures of surprise 
occurring when being uncertain of an outcome. From this theory, we can calculate the 
reduction of uncertainty by giving certain information using Mutual information (MI). We 
can quantify the information about how much one variable contains about another, when 
looking at two random variables mutual dependence, this is the mutual information (MI). 
High mutual information indicates a large reduction in uncertainty; low mutual information 
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indicates a small reduction in uncertainty. Zero mutual information between two random 
variables means the variables are completely independent. Intuitively, mutual information is a 
measure the information that X and Y share e.g., how much one of these variables reduces 
uncertainty about the other. For example, the mutual information between feedback (variable 
1) and outcome (variable 2) is the reduction in uncertainty about outcome (correct/incorrect 
response) after experiencing feedback. Mathematically this is given by the uncertainty in the 
outcome, minus the uncertainty of the outcome after having received feedback. The mutual 
information is a positive quantity reported in bits.  
In figure 10, we have two variables X-dark circle and Y-light circle, where X (dark circle) is 
a sound indicating your correct responses and Y (bright circle) is outcome (correct or 
incorrect response). A sound will give information to the participant that the choice they just 
made was correct. The mutual information between feedback and outcome is the reduction in 
uncertainty about the outcome (correct/incorrect) after experiencing feedback. Our 
calculation of the mutual information assumes that the subjects have no knowledge of the 
outcome prior to receiving external feedback. However, subjects may be able to assess 
whether their response was correct or incorrect using their internal monitoring system, i.e. 
without external feedback. For more detailed description and equations, see paper 1. 
 
Figure 10. Mutual information between the variable feedback (dark circle) and the variable outcome (bright 
circle). To the left there is no mutual information (feedback do not reduce uncertainty). In the middle there is 
high entropy and low mutual information (feedback reduce a little uncertainty about outcome. To the right there 
is low entropy and high mutual information (feedback reducing uncertainty about the outcome being correct or 
incorrect).  
3.3.4 Bayesian statistics 
Baysian hypothesis testing can be used to quantify evidence in favour of the null hypothesis 
(Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012) which p-values do not inform about. This kind of testing is 
becoming more used in experimental psychology (Dienes, 2011) where two competing 
hypothesis are assigned prior probabilities. In study I, it was useful for us to quantify how 
much evidence there was in favour of the null hypothesis that external feedback did not 
change reaction time or accuracy compared to when no external feedback was given on 
errors. The output in the Bayesian analysis; Bayes Factor, quantifies the strength of evidence 
for the alternative versus the null hypotheses from a ratio of prior probability of the 
alternative hypothesis divided by the prior probability of the null hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). 
If the Bayes factor has a values larger than 1 it depicts favouring the alternative hypothesis. A 
Bayes factor less than 1 is in favour the null hypothesis. Jeffreys (1961) quantified a Bayes 
factor as weak, substantial and strong strength of evidence for the null hypothesis where 
‘‘weak’’ in the range (1/3 to 1) ‘‘substantial’’ in the range (1/10 to 1/3), and ‘‘strong’’ in the 
range (1/30 to 1/10). In study 1 we used Log Bayes Factors equivalent to above mentioned 
categories “weak” (-1.1 to 0), “substantial” (-2.3 to -1.1) and “strong” (-3 to -2.3) evidence 
for null hypothesis. As exemplified in Dienes, (2011) the Bayes factor (BF) tells us how 
much more likely it is that our data have occurred under the alternative hypothesis than under 
the null hypothesis.  
 24 
3.3.5 Mediation analysis 
 
A mediation analysis tries to determine if the effect of one variable X on the dependent 
variable Y is explained partly by an effect of X on another variable M, which also has an 
effect on Y. The analysis tries to determine if the effect of X on Y is mediated by M. A path 
diagram of a model for simple mediation analysis is illustrated in Figure 11 (see for example 
Preacher & Hayes, (2004). In this model c denotes the total effect of X on Y, c’ the direct 
effect of X on Y and ab the indirect effect of X on Y. 
 
Figure 11. X-dependent variable, M-dependent variable (mediator), Y-independent variable. 
Path c’ is the direct effect of X on Y controlling for M, Path C is the total effect of X on Y. 
 
In Study III, we wanted to investigate if effort mediates the effect of feedback on WM 
improvements. Since we have four feedback groups, we have a multicategorical X-variable.  
Hayes & Preacher, (2013) describe a way to analyse the mediation effect when having a 
multicategorial variable. We used group 4 (feedback on both errors and corrects as our 
reference group since this is what is used today in Cogmed’s WM training program). 
Statistical inference for the indirect effect can be made using bootstrapping (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2004) to estimate percentile confidence intervals (CI). If the CI for the indirect effect 
does not contain zero, one can consider it statistically different from zero. We used the script 
mediate.ssp for SPSS from Preacher and Hayes (2014) to perform the mediation analysis, 
using 95% CI and 5000 samples for the bootstrap procedure.  
3.3.6 Brain Imaging 
In study IV, we have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to look at brain 
activations during different time points of interest. MRI is an imaging is a commonly used 
method used to visualize human brain anatomy in vivo. MRI has the major benefit of being 
non-invasive, without any known side effects. MRI also provides good spatial, whole brain 
resolution and in our study. To perform an MRI, the participant lies in a tube inside a strong 
magnetic field. The MR-scanner at the MR-research centre in Solna has a magnetic field 
strength of 3.0 Tesla (30000 gauss). A big magnet containing superconducting liquid helium 
creates this magnetic field. For a comparison, the magnetic field of earth is around 0.5 gauss. 
When a person lies in the scanner, the protons (basically the protons in hydrogen atoms) in 
their body align according to the magnetic B0 field. By sending in a radio frequent pulse (with 
a flip angel of 90 degrees) to the B0 field, a new magnetic field is induced. This pulse excites 
the protons in the participant’s body to a new energy state. When the radio frequent pulse 
stops the protons emits energy to return to their original B0 state. A coil placed around the 
participant’s head picks up this energy and by mathematical formulas creates images of the 
brain. Because different tissues in the body have different proton densities and chemical 
affinities, we will receive slightly different signals depending on the time it takes for the 
proton to originate to its’ low energy state. 
The participants were reminded of that they should not move their head during the whole 
scanning procedure. Foam pads were used to stabilize the participant’s head inside the coil 
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for further reduction of head movements. Since the scanner is loud, earplugs and hearing 
protection were used for all participants.  
Differences of grey and white matter are caused by difference in density, which we see when 
we receive a structural image of an individual’s brain anatomy. More specifically, the 
difference in grey and white matter, depends on the hydrogen atom in water being chemically 
bonded with other molecules in fat such as the myelin in white matter, which gives a different 
MR signal compared to grey matter. When we want to analyse how people react to a certain 
stimuli, we use something called functional MRI (fMRI). In fMRI we measure the absolute 
changes in concentration oxygenated blood called the blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
signal. The changes in BOLD signals vary due to the differences in oxygenated and 
deoxygenated blood. When oxygen is bound to the hemoglobin (oxyhemoglobin, Hb-O2) in 
red blood cells, erythrocytes, the heme component of the protein hemoglobin is covered by 
oxygen. The oxyhemoglobin is then diamagnetic where oxygen binds and covers the iron on 
the heme-group, which in turn changes the structure of the haemoglobin (Rhoades & Tanner, 
2003).When oxygen is dropped off, the structure of the deoxygenated hemoglobin changes to 
a paramagnetic structure, making the iron more exposed. This changes the signal in the 
imaging field so that oxygenated blood where iron is shielded increases the signal compared 
to deoxygenated blood (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990). Thus, fMRI is an indirect measure 
of neural activation caused by changes in the absolute concentration of deoxy-Hb. This 
hemodynamic response, when oxygenated blood is delivered to active neuronal tissues 
changes the concentration of oxygenated blood in areas that are currently more active. BOLD 
is found to peaks after about 4-5 sec after stimulus onset (Hall et al., 2000). When giving the 
participant a stimulus, for example a flash of light, more oxygenated blood flow to areas such 
as the primary visual cortex (Ogawa et al., 1992). In study IV, we compared how people react 
to different types of feedback using this technique, fMRI. 
For the imaging studies we used the 3 Tesla GE scanner (Discovery MR750, GE) using an 8-
channel head coil at the MR Research Centre in Solna. The whole brain were covered using 
40 contiguous oblique slices with slice thickness 3.0 mm with 0.5 mm gap, with a flip angle 
90°, Repetition time (TR) = 2600ms; time echo (TE) = 30ms; Field of View (FOV); 28,8cm; 
matrix size 96x96. The normalized voxel size was 2x2x2 mm
3
. A high-resolution 3D 
gradient-echo, T1-weighted anatomical image was also collected for each participant. 
Functional images sensitive to blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrasts were 
acquired using gradient-echo, EPI (Echo Planar Imaging, T2*-weighted images.  We used the 
software Cogent (UCL, London, UK) supported by Matlab (r2010a, The Math Works, 
Natick, MA) for sequence presentation and data collection. 
3.3.7 fMRI analysis 
In the fMRI study we have used an event related design instead of a block design. Some 
advantages of an event related design is that trial presentation can be randomized and that 
difference in neural activity evoked by the experimental conditions during different trials can 
be tested (D’Esposito, Zarahn, & Aguirre, 1999). However, if two trials adjacent to each 
other are compared, it is possible that they share some activity and hence not differ from each 
other. We used a jittered interval between last stimulus with feedback and new stimulus 
symbol, to separate and de-correlate the event of seeing feedback from the event where a new 
symbol appeared. 
Image processing and analysis were performed using SPM12b (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), 
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK. The scanner discarded the first six 
volumes automatically and the remaining volumes were realigned to the first volume to 
correct for head movements. We set an origin at the anterior commissure for each participant 
on his or her anatomical scan. The functional images were realigned to compensate for head 
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movement in each of the sessions and a file containing the six movement regressions were 
created. The volumes were co-registered so that each functional image is placed against the 
individual’s anatomical image. During segmentation the anatomical image was bias corrected 
for grey and white matter contrast. All subjects’ brains are anatomically unique so during 
normalization the subject brains are adjusted into a standard brain template taken from the 
Montreal Neurological Institute. The fMRI data were finally smoothed spatially with an 
isotropic Gaussian filter of 10 mm full width at half-maximum, to reduce variability between 
subjects and to increase the signal to noise ratio. For each participant, the timing vectors of 
the individual different onset times of bivalent and univalent key presses, bivalent and 
univalent rule and cue symbols were made in a 1st level analysis. In the 2nd level analysis all 
participants’ results were put together so that a full-factorial design could be performed to 
analyse the effects of the experimental conditions on a group level. 
3.3.8 Multiple comparisons 
In fMRI analysis each volume consist of with about 100 000 of voxels. Using a threshold of 
p<0.05, we would get 5000 false positive voxels when compared to the other 100 000 voxels 
in a volume. This means we would reject the null hypothesis of having no effect in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis of a significant effect in 5000 voxels. To minimize the risk of this, 
we have corrected for multiple comparisons using family wise error (FWE) correction. We 
report FWE corrected statistics of whole brain activations (p<0.05). We also report effects on 
a more liberal threshold of whole brain (p<0.001) uncorrected for multiple comparisons in 
order to give the reader a more comprehensive picture of the brain activation patterns.   
Since our research is partly based on findings from previous papers, we wanted to investigate 
if we could replicate previous researches findings using similar experimental methods. In 
order to test for our a priori hypothesis (based on previous findings) we look for activations 
in specific areas that have previously been found more activated in a certain type of task or 
after a certain type of stimuli. We had an hypothesis that the participant would think more 
about themselves and their intelligence after the feedback ‘you are clever’ and hence 
paracingulum regions were chosen from previous studies by Bengtsson, Dolan, & 
Passingham, (2011) and Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, (2010). When testing our hypothesis 
that the paracingulum would be more active in trait condition, we studied BOLD activation in 
4, 6 and 8-mm spheres (FWE), at the event of seeing the bivalent rule symbol, and at the 
event of seeing the feedback in the trait feedback and task feedback conditions during the FS 
and NFS. We also created covariates on the second level SPM analysis where we tested for 
correlations between BOLD and the different outcome measures; motivation scores, stress 
scores, difficulty scores and performance accuracy. Because we tested four outcome 
measures, we corrected the p-values for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni’s correction. 
Anatomical locations were further verified by using the Duvernoy atlas (Duvernoy, 1999; 
Naidich, TP, Duvernoy HM, Delman BN, Sorensen AG, Kollias SS, 2009). 
4 RESULTS AND SHORT DISCUSSION 
4.1 RESULTS STUDY I 
4.1.1 Brief description of study design 
We investigated the effects on RT and accuracy of external feedback on errors and correct 
responses during a sequential WM task in adults. We report results of the effect of feedback 
and its placement (errors, correct responses after errors and general other correct responses) 
on performance accuracy and response time. 
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Hypothesis: Errors, correct after errors and general correct responses are differently sensitive 
to feedback reflected in reaction time and accuracy differences. 
4.1.2 Accuracy 
4.1.2.1 Internal and external feedback on error: 
We found that external feedback given on all errors did not change performance accuracy 
compared to internal feedback on errors (Figure 12A).  
4.1.2.2 Internal and external feedback on correct after errors (CAE)  
At the time when making a correct response after errors, external feedback did have an effect 
on performance accuracy compared to no external feedback. It seemed that during this time 
point participants were more sensitive to external feedback since performance was reduced 
for the main effect contrast where feedback was present in this particular phase compare do 
all sequences where internal feedback (no external feedback) was presented here (Figure 12 
B).  
4.1.2.3 Internal and external feedback on general correct (GC) response  
General correct responses (correct following corrects) generated performance reductions 
when external feedback was given on all, compared to when external feedback was given on 
only 20% of the correct responses. 
 
 
Figure 12 ABCD. Accuracy in % correct responses. A) Accuracy on sequences without and with external 
feedback on errors. B) Accuracy on sequences without and with external feedback on correct after errors. C) 
Accuracy on sequences without external feedback on general correct responses (0%), with external feedback on 
random 20% of the general correct responses (20%) and on all general correct responses (100%). D) Accuracy 
where the 12 sequences where sequence [010] is displayed as a star (p<0.05). 
80
82
84
86
88
90
%
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
intrinsic  extrinsic 
A 
   
  n.s  
80
82
84
86
88
90
%
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
intrinsic  extrinsic 
B 
* 
 
80
82
84
86
88
90
%
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
0%     20%    100%  
C 
* 
 
n.s  
n.s  
80
82
84
86
88
90
%
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
0%     20%    100%  
D 
* n.s 
* 
* 
 28 
4.1.2.4 Amount of external feedback on general correct response 
We noted that there was a sequence [010; 81% correct responses] where external feedback 
was given on 0% of the general corrects but sounds on CAE, which is displayed as a star in 
the more detailed Figure 12D. This combination seemed to be particularly disturbing. When 
looking at groups of sequences illustrated in figure 1D we see that there was a significant 
difference in receiving sound on all general correct responses (100%) compared to receiving 
no sound on general correct responses (0%) when [010] is excluded, (p<0.05). There was also 
a difference receiving sound on all general correct responses (100%) to receiving sounds on 
20% of the general correct responses (p<0.05). This illustrates that sequences with a lot of 
external feedback (sound) are the less beneficial sequences for accuracy, regardless of if 
external feedback on errors or CAE is presented or not (if removing the outlier sequence 
[010]). 
4.1.3 Interactions accuracy 
There was a significant interaction between errors (E) and general corrects (GC) where 
external feedback on errors, together with sound on all general corrects (GC) [102] [112], 
resulted in reduced performance compared to the other sequences (E) and (GC) 
combinations, F(2, 164) = 71.8, p < 0.0001. The interaction analysis between corrects after 
errors (CAE) and general corrects (GC) also revealed a significant effect F(2, 164) = 75.2, p 
< 0.0001. Performance was significantly improved when no external feedback was presented 
on CAE in combination with either no external feedback on GC or when there was external 
feedback on only 20% of the corrects following corrects [100] [000] [101]. 
4.1.4 Reaction time 
4.1.4.1 Internal and external feedback on error  
We did not find any RT differences after errors depending on external or internal feedback 
(Figure 13A). 
4.1.4.2 Internal and external feedback on correct after errors (CAE)  
We did not find any RT differences on CAE-correct depending on external or internal 
feedback (Figure 13B). 
4.1.4.3 General correct responses and amount: 
We found RT differences between internal and external feedback where external feedback on 
all correct responses were quicker compared to internal feedback (Figure 13C). 
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Figure 13 ABC. Reaction time A) RT when given sound or silence on errors. B) RT when giving sound or 
silence on correct after errors. C) RT when no sound 0%, 20% sound or 100% sound was given on general 
correct responses we find a significant difference between 0 % and 100% sound. D) All individual sequences 
shown, with significant difference in RT between 0% and 100% sound on general correct responses (p<0.05). 
When looking at the individual sequences displayed in the figure above we can see that there 
is only a difference in RT between 0 and 100% external feedback (sound) on general corrects 
(p<0.05). For the sequences shown in 13D [011] and [111] are slower in RT than the 
sequences [001] and [101]. This suggests that in the absence of external feedback on the 
correct response after an error, participants had an overall quicker RT. 
4.1.5 Interactions RT 
The interaction analysis regarding RT showed that external feedback on CAE and GC 
revealed a significant effect F(2, 164) = 3.3, (p < 0.05), meaning that RT was significantly 
faster in the conditions where external feedback was received on CAE together with external 
feedback on all GC, that is, the [012] and [112]. 
4.1.6 Mutual information 
We quantified how much information one variable (sounds), gives about another variable (the 
outcome being correct or incorrect). If we receive external feedback (sound) on errors, we 
will be sure that we made an error when we hear a sound. This means that we have high 
mutual information between feedback sound and outcome. In study I, we first calculated the 
mutual information of our two fictive sequences (see paper I for details of this calculation) 
with the following result: Sequence: ([100] 20% errors, auditory feedback on all errors) gives 
MI = 0.722; there is no uncertainty in the outcome after hearing the feedback. This is because 
feedback was always provided after an error e.g. upon hearing a sound we can be sure we 
made an error. Sequence 2: ([001], (20% errors, no feedback on errors, auditory feedback on 
20% of correct responses) gives lower MI = 0.057. That is, Sequence 2 feedback provides 
less information about outcome than does Sequence 1.  
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We then evaluated if reaction time was influenced by MI. In particular we investigated if 
external information on an error, sequence [100], would be more informative, higher MI 
(reducing uncertainty about the outcome) to a participant than external feedback on a random 
correct responses [001], and thus influencing RT. We predicted from hypothetical sequences 
MI would be around 0.7 bits for the sequence [100] meaning that we would reduce 
uncertainty that we have made a mistake after hearing the feedback while we would not be as 
certain when hearing the feedback on random correct responses. However we found the 
opposite relationship between the two sequences where in fact a sound on errors did not 
reduce uncertainty about the outcome more than before receiving the feedback, MI for [001] 
0.49 bits and MI in [100] 0.62 and these sequences differed significantly from each other 
p<0.001(figure 14A). MI for these sequences did not correlate with RT. We also wanted to 
test if mutual information correlated with RT for the sequences with external feedback on all 
correct responses. We found that mutual information was quite high when sound was given 
on all correct responses, thus reducing uncertainty about the outcomes (Fig 14B). MI was 
0.68 bits on [012] and 0.58 bits on [102] (Fig 14B). The MI in these sequences correlated 
with RT showing that the higher the mutual information (participants extracting more 
information that this is a correct response), the quicker they responded (Fig 15AB).  
 
Figure 14AB) Mutual information (MI). A) MI for the two sequences with about the same amount of feedback 
but placed differently. Sequence [100] with feedback on all errors and sequence [001] with feedback on 20% or 
random correct responses. B) Mutual information (MI) for these two sequences describes that there is a quite 
high reduction in uncertainty when hearing the sound on all correct responses especially for the sequence [012]. 
 
Figure 15AB) Mutual information and RT. A) There was a correlation between RT and MI in the sequence 
where sound was given on all correct responses [012] (p<0.05), the higher MI (extracting information from the 
sound reducing uncertainty about the outcome) the quicker the participants respond (lower RT). B) There was a 
correlation between RT and MI in the sequence where sound was given on correct responses and errors [102] 
(p<0.05) the higher MI (extracting information from the sound reducing uncertainty about the outcome) the 
quicker the participants respond. 
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4.1.7 Short discussion  
We found that external feedback on general correct responses reduced reaction time and 
accuracy. The combination with feedback on both errors and correct responses [102] [112] 
was not beneficial for performance since it reduced performance accuracy found in the 
interaction analysis. We also found that on the first correct response after an error was a 
phase particularly sensitive to external feedback since accuracy was reduced when external 
feedback was presented at this point. RT and accuracy was not influenced by error-feedback; 
sequences with feedback on errors and without feedback on errors did not differ in overall 
performance or RT. This supports the argument that internal error monitoring is sufficient in 
a 2-back task where performance is approximately 80%.  
Analysing mutual information we found that MI was higher for [001] than for [100]. One 
theory of why the reduction in uncertainty was not as big as we expected in [100] may have 
been because participants were able to ignore the actual error feedback thus relying mostly on 
their own internal feedback system. The model calculating MI is based on the notion that the 
participants do not know at all if they have made an error or correct response, but it is 
possible that this is not often the case, and that instead participants rely a lot on their own 
internal feedback system.  
When comparing MI of the sequence with sound on errors to the sequence with 20% sound 
on general corrects, the sound on general correct responses may have been more difficult for 
the participants to ignore since participants want to attend to correct (positive) feedback. 
Thus, this may have been why participants extracted more information from this feedback 
resulting in higher MI. It is possible that feedback on correct responses are harder to ignore, 
which needs to be to further investigated in future studies.  
4.1.8 Limitations and future direction 
How we react to external feedback may depend a lot on the individual, which makes it hard 
to find the optimal feedback type for each task. We did not measure any individual 
characteristics of the participants in this study, which would have been very interesting. We 
had a mixed design where participants performed several sequences but not all. It would have 
been more optimal if all the participants had performed all sequences. In this study, we find 
that too much feedback was not beneficial and that error-feedback does not have to be 
externally delivered. However, the study was made in a lab environment and thus we do not 
know if these effects could transfer in other settings such as for example a classroom setting 
or in a computer game. Therefore, we continued with analysing the effect of trial-based 
feedback in study III, where we test children doing WM training in the classroom for 5 
weeks. 
In this study we did not distinguish between errors made on matches, when a letter had been 
shown two steps back (30% or trials) compared to errors made on non-matches (70% of 
trials), which would have been interesting since external feedback may be taken in differently 
depending on the character of the errors. Furthermore, it would have been interesting to 
differentiate between errors occurring due to non-presses and error made by actual choice and 
the effect of feedback and mutual information regarding outcome and feedback here. Since 
participants were instructed to press after all letters, we did not have many non-presses. 
In our study, we did not distinguish between errors made by pressing on the wrong button 
due to a motor error or a faulty memory process. Therefore, we do not know which errors are 
mistakes where participant thought they made the correct choice and which are slips that 
happened due to motor error of which participants knew that they pressed incorrectly already 
before receiving any external feedback. Due to the nature of the task, we believe that there are 
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more slips and this may be why the internal error process seems to work so well in this task. 
Unfortunately, we did not try to distinguish between these two types. In retrospect, a simpler 
task such as a Flanker task or Stroop task could have been chosen since in these task errors 
are almost exclusively slips, however, it is yet not clear if we would have received the same 
CAE effects which should be further tested. 
4.2 RESULTS STUDY II 
4.2.1 Brief description of study design 
The aim was to investigate if the tendency to drop out from the training program was related 
to low intrinsic motivation and to having an entity mindset. We recruited 112 children (mean 
age 13.0 ± 0.6 years old, 58 boys) to perform ≥20 sessions of computerized WM training 
where each session lasted for approximately 50 minutes.  
Prior to the training, the participants answered six selected questions from the Intrinsic 
Motivation Inventory (IMI) (McAuley et al., 1989). Three Theory Of Intelligence (TOI) 
questions regarding a participants mindset, were also asked which have been previously been 
used to measure mindset (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995).  The participants filled in the questions 
again at the end of the training period. Only the participants who completed a minimum of 20 
sessions responded to the questionnaire at the end of the training. Thus, only the questionnaires 
administered pre-training were used for this study.  
Hypothesis of study II:  Participants with an incremental mindset and high intrinsic motivation 
will spend a longer period adhering to the WM training protocol. 
4.2.2 Trained sessions and psychometric ratings 
The 112 participants, who signed up from three schools in Sweden trained on average 16.4 
±7.7 sessions (table 1) where less than half of them, fifty-three participants (47%, 24 boys, 29 
girls) completed the 20 days of WM training. Four participants did not fill in the 
questionnaires due to technical failure.  
  M SD N 
Trained sessions all 16.4  7.7 112 
Trained sessions School 1 18.0 8.7 22 
Trained sessions School 2 13.7 6.6 66 
Trained sessions School 3 22.3 6.0 24 
Motivation Q1  5.2 1.7 108 
Motivation Q2  4.5 1.4 108 
Motivation Q3  5.6 1.4 108 
Motivation Q4 5.4 1.5 108 
Motivation Q5  4.4 1.9 108 
Motivation Q6 5.5 1.6 108 
Motivation Q7  5.7 1.6 108 
Motivation average  5.2 1.2 108 
Mindset Q1  4.1 1.7 108 
Mindset Q2  3.7 1.7 108 
Mindset Q3  3.8 1.6 108 
Mindset average  3.9 1.3 108 
Table 1. Number of trained sessions, motivation scores and mind.-set scores  
  33 
4.2.3 Mindset 
Mindset correlated negatively with amount of trained sessions, r(108)=-0.22, p=0.03 (table 1) 
meaning that the more incremental (low scores) the mindset, the longer they trained. 
Furthermore, dividing the participants in those who completed and those who did not 
complete 20 training, there was a significant difference in average mindset scores 
t(107)=6.01, p<0.01 (figure 16). Those who completed the training had lower mindset scores 
indicating a more incremental mindset, compared to those who did not complete. 
 
Figure 16. Completion of training and mindset. Lower mindset scores, indicating an incremental mindset was 
found in the group who completed ≥20 days of WM training compared to those who did not (p<0.01). 
4.2.4 Motivation 
We tested if the number of trained sessions correlated motivation. Motivation scores 
correlated with amount of trained sessions, r(108)=0.23, p=0.002 (table 2). 
Measures                                                                                                          Duration 
Motivation Total .23* 
Q1. I believe the training will be good for me .27** 
Q2. I believe that I will be pretty good at this type of training -.07 
Q3. I will put effort into this when I do the training .16 
Q4. I believe the training will be challenging -.05 
Q5. I believe the training will be fun .27** 
Q6. It is important for me to do well on this training .19* 
Q7. I believe I will go through with all of the training sessions .21* 
TOI Total -.22* 
QI1. You have a certain amount of intelligence and you can’t do much to change it. -.11 
QI2. Your intelligence is something that you can’t change very much. -.24* 
QI3. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence -.18 
Table 2. Correlation of motivation scores and TOI scores with training duration. All correlations are reported and 
level of significance are displayed, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
Furthermore, dividing the participants in those who completed and those who did not 
complete 20 training sessions, there was a significant difference in average motivation scores, 
t(107)=4.25, p=0.04. Those who completed the training rated a higher motivation prior to 
training. However, both the participants who completed the training (trained ≥20 sessions) 
and those who dropped out (<20 days training) scored above 4, indicating high motivation 
scores.  
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4.2.5 Coaches and trained sessions 
There was a difference between trained sessions and coaches, F(2,109)=14.7, p=0.001. The 
post-hoc analysis showed that School 2 differed significantly from the other schools (p<0.05) 
with fewer trained sessions.  Mindset scores did not differ between schools F(2,105)=1.83, 
p=0.17. Motivation scores did not differ between schools F(2,105)=2.50, p=0.09 (table 3). 
  Schools (1-3)  
  1 2 3  F 
N 22 66 24   
Boys 14 33 11   
Girls 8 33 13   
Training location Home School School   
Trained sessions 17.95 (SD = 8.65) 13.67 (SD = 6.66) 22.29 (SD = 6.03) 14.7*** 
Mindset  3.49 (SD = 1.65) 4.07 (SD = 1.25) 3.69 (SD = 1.12) 1.83 
Motivation 5.05(SD = 2.17) 4.85 (SD = 1.35) 5.56(SD = 0.79) 2.50 
Table 3. The schools partaking (gender, location, trained days) and F-scores. 
4.2.6 Feedback groups, coaches and training duration 
The children were randomized into one of four feedback groups to be part of a larger study 
but since so many students dropped out, we later added more participants for this purpose 
(Study III). The feedback groups were; 1) sound on correct responses and positive verbal 
feedback; 2) sounds on incorrect responses and encouraging verbal feedback; 3) no sound 
and no verbal feedback; 4) sounds on correct and incorrect responses and both positive and 
encouraging verbal feedback (see Study III). There were no differences in amount of trained 
days between the feedback groups, F(3,108)=1.3, p=0.277, ηp2=0.035(table 4). 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 F 
N 29 30 26 27   
Sessions 15.62(SD=7.9) 18.73(SD=7.5) 15.42(SD=7.8) 15.41 (SD=7.6) 1.3 
Table 4. Feedback groups and trained days. 
4.2.7 Short discussion 
We wanted to investigate if intrinsic motivation and mindset played a role in participant’s 
compliance with a WM training protocol. We found that beliefs regarding one’s intelligence, 
whether it is perceived as a fixed entity or seen as something that can be changed with effort 
and training (incremental) influenced the number of trained sessions. Our results are in line 
with previous research where an incremental mindset have been found to increase the time 
spent on a task (Blackwell et al., 2007; O’Rourke, Haimovitz, Ballweber, Dweck, & Popović, 
2014), and we have now shown that this also applies for a WM training program.  
We also found that an average score of the subset of the IMI questions which measure 
subjective enjoyment, effort and competence, correlated with completion of training. Our 
results show that if the participant believed in their ability and if they thought the training 
would be of value they were more likely to train for more sessions. That an optimistic view 
correlated positively with trained sessions is in line with popular theories that people try to 
match their outcomes with their expectations (Dutton & Brown, 1997) or that expectations of 
one’s own performance influence the performance outcome (Bengtsson & Penny, 2013). 
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Our result show that people who think that the training will make them improve and that 
intelligence can increase with training, are the persons who keep training. Therefore, for 
coaches and teachers who are to introduce a very demanding task, it is of great importance to 
make the trainees understand that they can improve through training. In addition, if the 
trainees are given a clear purpose of the task, their persistence may increase. As a bonus, it 
seems to help if participants believed the training would be fun.  
4.2.8 Limitations and future direction 
The present study has the limitation that three schools took part with different coaches. The 
potential differences in coaching style were unfortunately not analysed due to the lack of 
information regarding each coach. The different schools did not show differences in average 
motivation scores before starting the training. The type of response given by the coach when 
the student struggled with the training may however have influenced the student’s motivation 
to either continue or quit. In line the study by Rattan, Good, and Dweck, (2012) guidelines of 
how a coach can respond to lack of motivation and how to use feedback should be developed 
and studied.  
4.3 RESULTS STUDY III 
4.3.1 Brief description of method 
The aim of the study was to investigate the effects of trial-based feedback on WM 
improvement, effort and motivation. We tested if the effect of feedback on WM 
improvements was mediated by the effect of effort. In addition, we also evaluated a new 
measure of effort by correlating this measure with motivation and mindset scores. 
In total 177 children (mean age 13.8 ± 1.3, 93 boys) signed up to perform the WM training. 
We only included the participant who completed ≥20 sessions of training which leaves 133 
participants in the WM-training analysis, mean age 13.5 ± 0.9 years, 68 boys. We used four 
feedback groups (Figure 17), see section 3.3.1 Task Setup, page 20.  
Feedback groups 1 2 3 4 
Corrects two-tone 
sounds 
Sound Click Click Sound 
Errors descending 
sound 
Click Sound Click Sound 
Comments regarding 
corrects 
Well 
done 
  
Well 
done 
Comments regarding 
errors 
  
That was 
close 
  
That was 
close  
Figure 17. Feedback groups in study II and III with sounds on correct or errors and feedback comments on 
correct and errors, or no comments or neutral click sounds. 
We used the same motivational questions (McAuley et al., 1989) adapted for this particular 
WM training as in Study II before and after the training to see if feedback influenced the 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation. For the same purpose, we also used the same three mindset 
questions as used in Study II. 
Hypothesis of study III: Trial-based external feedback will influence WM training 
improvements, and motivation as measured by intrinsic motivation questions, mindset 
questions and a newly developed effort score. 
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4.3.2 Results of feedback effects on WM training  
There were differences in maximum WM training scores between the four feedback groups, 
when controlling for age and start index, F(3,127)=3.104,  p=0.04, ηp
2
= .06. The post-hoc 
analyses showed that the group receiving both negative and positive feedback (Group 4) had 
significantly lower max scores than the group who received only positive feedback (Group 
1); β =-7.56, p=0.005, two-tailed. Group 4 also had lower max scores than the group who did 
not receive any feedback at all (Group 3), β =-4.84, p=0.035, (one-tailed). The group who got 
only error feedback (Group 2) did not differ from Group 4, β =-3.19, p=0.23. This suggests a 
negative effect of having both positive and negative feedback together. For the different 
index improvements (max score – start score) see Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18. Index improvements (max-start) scores in the four feedback groups.                                                
Group 1; 27.6 ±13.3, Group 2; 23.1 ±7.94, Group 3; 24.7 ± 11.9 and Group 4; 19.9 ±8.64. 
4.3.3 Feedback effects on intrinsic motivation 
There was a close to significant effect of feedback on motivation scores (before and after 
training), F(3,127)=2.42, p=0.065, ηp2=.05. This was explained by a trend of a bigger drop in 
motivation for Group 4 (feedback on both corrects and errors) compared to Group 2 
(feedback on errors) β = 0.43, p=0.07, and Group 3 (no feedback) compared to Group 2 
(feedback on errors), β =0.42, p=0.07, illustrated in figure 19.  
 
Figure 19. Post-pre motivation scores before training and after training in the four feedback groups 
4.3.4 Feedback effects on effort scores 
There was a trend of a difference in effort scores between the four feedback groups illustrated 
in figure 20, F(3,127)=2.294,  p=0.08, ηp
2
= .05. When looking at the post-hoc analyses we 
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found that group 3 showed lower effort scores compared to group 1; β = -7.34, p=0.02; 
compared to group 2 β =-6.321, p=0.045; and compared to group 4 β =-6.21, p=0.05.  
 
                 Figure 20. Effort scores in the four feedback groups 
4.3.5 Evaluation of effort score 
Effort score correlated with; start index, r=0.46, p<0.001 (figure 21), index improvement 
r=0.235, p=0.007 and intrinsic motivation before starting, r=0.20, p=0.02. Higher start index, 
higher index improvements and higher motivation was associated with increased effort 
during the training. We also analysed if all individual questions correlated with effort using 
Spearman correlations (table 5). 
 
Figure 21. Effort scores and WM scores at start of the training program show significant correlation where the 
higher the score in the beginning the more effort the child puts in later in the training (r=0.46, p<0.001). 
Measures Effort scores (r) 
Start Index 0.46*** 
Index improvements (max-start) 0.24*** 
Motivation Total 0.20* 
Motivation Q1; I believe the training will be good for me 0.19* 
Motivation Q2; I believe that I will be pretty good at this type of training 0.10 
Motivation Q3; I will put effort into the training 0.24** 
Motivation Q4; I believe the training will be challenging 0.06 
Motivation Q5; I believe the training will be fun -0.03 
Motivation Q6; It is important for me to do well on this training 0.15 
Motivation Q7; I believe I will go through with all of the training sessions 0.17* 
Mindset Total -0.15+ 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Table 5. Correlations between effort scores and start WM index, WM index improvement, motivation and 
mindset scores before training.  
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4.3.6 Short discussion  
In this study, we found that feedback influenced WM training. The participants in Group 4 
got external feedback on both correct responses and errors. This group showed significantly 
less training improvements compared to Group 1 who received external feedback on correct 
responses only and compared to Group 3 who did not receive any feedback.  
Looking at error feedback, the group receiving external error-feedback only (Group 2) did not 
differ significantly from the group without feedback (Group 3). This suggests that external 
error-feedback alone does not have a significant impact on training improvements. 
Commenting on person’s errors does not seem to be particularly helpful for WM 
improvements, neither in Group 2 (with only error-feedback) nor in Group 4 (with both error 
and correct feedback). These two groups did not differ in WM max index scores. In study I, 
we also found that external error information did not differ in accuracy from internal error 
feedback when looking at accuracy and that the error feedback did not add informative value 
to the participants. Looking at correct feedback, when given on its own, the WM index 
training improvements did not differ from when no external feedback is given (group 1 
compared to group 3). 
When external feedback was given on either corrects or errors alone it did not seem to have 
as much negative impact as when both error and correct feedback was given. If a person was 
able to prevent a shift of attention towards a sound as described in Hughes et al., (2013) the 
individual should be able to perform and improve in a difficult task such as this WM training 
program. It may be that participants wished to attend to external positive encouragements 
because of the nature of rewards and by doing so it got harder to neglect external error 
information, when this was given. Trying to attend to the positive feedback but at the same 
time trying to ignore the external negative error feedback, may take up more attention from 
the task.  
We conclude that the feedback used today in the WM training program (same as received by 
group 4) does not seem to be the most suitable for this type of training. This can be of great 
value for future adjustments in computerized trial to trial tasks to try avoiding feedback that 
interfere with the participants focus of attention. 
The degree of effort that participants put in during training was positively related with high 
start index score. The participants should not be able to know themselves if they have high or 
low WM capacity. Yet, as children tend to compare their scores to each other this may lead to 
that those that have higher WM compared to others know this and therefore this may evoke a 
sense of mastery in children. This feeling, may lead to putting in more effort into the training. 
Another theory is that persons WM at start reflects an ability to focus on a task for a long 
time. This can influence participants with high start WM work to work for a longer time on a 
difficult level without giving up, receiving higher effort scores.  
An average score of all motivation questions correlated with effort scores later in the training. 
However, individual questions showed differences in correlations with effort. The questions; 
‘I believe the training will be good for me’ (Q1), ‘I will put effort into the training’ (Q3) and 
‘I believe I will go through with all of the training sessions’ (Q7) all correlated positively 
with effort scores. This suggests that these questions reflect the motivation to induce effort. 
Interesting to note is that in study II, Q1, Q5, Q6 and Q7 influenced the participant’s number 
of trained days. This suggests that believing that the training will be good for them is both 
good for persisting with the whole program and for working on a very difficult level, which 
demands much effort. The new effort score correlated with motivation questionnaires and can 
be used as a complementary measure to the subjective measures of motivation. 
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4.3.7  Limitations and future direction 
This study included a subgroup of individuals diagnosed with ADHD. Children with ADHD, 
who receive high incentives during a task, have been found to deactivate the DFM-network in 
a similar manner as they do when the dopamine agonist methylphenidate is used. This gives 
an indication that extrinsic rewards such incentives have a strong effect in persons with 
ADHD (Liddle et al., 2011). It is therefore possible that testing a large group of children with 
ADHD would lead to larger distinctions between Group 1 (only positive feedback) and the 
other groups since people with ADHD may benefit even more from receiving only external 
rewards as explained by Liddle et al., (2011). This could however not be tested in this study 
but will be interesting to look at in future studies. Furthermore, it would have been interesting 
to distinguish between outcome feedback sounds and verbal feedback comments that for 
future studies can be studied separately. 
Depending of the origin of motivation it can be divided as intrinsic and extrinsic. 
Unfortunately, we did only ask intrinsic motivation questions even though there are extrinsic 
motivation questionnaires used in for example the study by (Buckworth, Lee, Regan, 
Schneider, & DiClemente, 2007). If parents promise their children that they will get an ice 
cream when the homework is done and no ice cream otherwise, the ice-cream works as an 
extrinsic motivator. This short ‘carrot and stick’ approach (Dickinson, 2001) have come to 
spread over different disciplines where rewards and bonuses are often given for hard work 
and is often adopted by parents. Extrinsic rewards have however become a controversial topic 
since this type of externally driven motivation can also have negative effects. When people 
perform more simple tasks it has been argued that rewards and punishments can be 
beneficial, whereas for more complex problems solving where creative solutions and 
experimenting is a major part, external rewards might be negative for the learning process 
(Amabile, Hennessey, & Grossman, 1986). This type of external feedback used in this task 
may not transfer to other types of task which should be taken into consideration. 
4.4 RESULTS STUDY IV 
4.4.1 Brief description of method 
The aim of Study IV was to investigate how positive feedback directed at someone’s trait; 
being smart or someone’s action; choosing correctly, influence performance improvements, 
motivation and brain activation during a rule-switching task.  
The effect of mindset seems to play a role for improvements and completion of WM training 
as shown e.g. in Study II and III. Previous long-term studies have looked at how mindsets 
develop in accordance to feedback exposure during childhood (Gunderson et al., 2013). In the 
present study, we wanted to investigate if feedback on trait (you are clever) and feedback on 
action (your choice was correct) could influence task attention on a short-term, instant basis 
and we investigated the neural processes that underlie this attentional regulation.  
Twenty healthy participants (age 24±5.6, 8 females) were scanned with fMRI twice in a 
within subject design. Two other participants were tested but excluded, one because of 
performance below chance-level, the other for attending only one session. Participants were 
neurologically healthy, right-handed, and with Swedish (n=13) or English (n=7) as their 
mother tongue. They performed the task in their native language. The participants took part in 
four scanning sessions, two sessions per visit, in a computer based rule-switching task (E. A. 
Crone et al., 2006). A minimum of one day before starting the experiment the participants 
filled in burns depression inventory and Rosenberg self-esteem score, and four selected 
questions regarding intelligence mindset orientation.  
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At three times during scanning, the participants rated their motivation, stress, and task 
difficulty by answering three questions asked by the experimenter; How motivated are you to 
continue with the task?; How stressed do you feel right now?; How difficult did you find the 
task? Ratings were of 1-10; 1-very calm/unmotivated/easy, 10-very 
stressed/motivated/difficult. The questions were asked before the cognitive task, after FS, and 
after NFS (difficulty ratings were not given before the task). After the experiment, the 
participants wrote down how they experienced the feedback during the different sessions with 
the questions; What did you think about the test with feedback? What did you think about the 
test without feedback? 
Behavioural data; accuracy (% correct), reaction time (RT), motivation scores, stress scores, 
and difficulty scores were analysed with repeated measures ANOVAs, and Student’s paired t-
tests for post-hoc comparisons in SPSS (SPSS Inc, Chicago, USA). All the behavioural 
analyses were controlled for the order of which the participants received each feedback type 
(day of testing). In order to test for significance of brain activations, we investigated the main 
effect of bivalent trials, main effect of condition (task/trait), and interactions between rule 
(bivalent/univalent) and condition (task/trait). This was done for both the FS and the NFS, 
locked to the event of seeing the rule symbol as well as at the event of pressing the key i.e. 
seeing the feedback.  
Hypothesis study IV: Trait feedback evokes more focus on one’s character (self) which will 
be reflected in increased paracingulate cortex activation and trait feedback will lead to 
reduced motivation and performance improvements compared to task feedback. 
4.4.2 Accuracy improvements 
The accuracy was higher in the no feedback session (NFS) compared to the session with 
feedback (FS) for both types of feedback, F(1,18)= 6.24, p=0.02). There was a few % more 
increase from FS to NFS when task feedback was used compared to trait feedback, t(19)= 
3.55, p=0.04, one-sided (figure 22). 
Accuracy was significantly higher for univalent trials compared to bivalent trials during FS 
F(1,18)=31.18, p=0.001, and NFS F(1,18)=8.796 p=0.008. Participants showed more 
improvement in the task feedback condition from FS to NFS compared to trait feedback, 
when looking at only bivalent trials F(2,18)= 3.907,  p=0.03, one-sided but no such 
difference was found when looking at univalent trials only, F(2,18)=0.423, p=0.26. 
 
Figure 22. Accuracy, improvement and motivation scores for task and trait feedback 
4.4.3 Reaction time 
Reaction time was slower when receiving feedback (FS) compared to when feedback was not 
received (NFS) F(1,18)=29.3, p=0.001, but no difference depending on the feedback type, 
F(1,18)=0.11, p=0.73. 
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4.4.4 Motivation, stress and difficulty ratings 
Feedback affected motivation F(1.18)=6.2, p=0.02. Participants rated higher motivation to 
continue the task after task feedback compared to after trait-feedback F(1,18)=6.2, p=0.02. 
There was an effect of feedback on stress F(1,18)=14.69, p=0.001, where task-feedback 
induced less stress than trait-feedback. The first visit induced more stress within the 
individuals when they got trait feedback compared to the participants who got task feedback 
on their first visit F(1,18)=12.1, p=0.003. 
We found no difference in difficulty ratings dependent on feedback F(1,18)=0.22, p=0.65. 
4.4.5 Debriefing 
Some more negative views were found after trait feedback such as ‘distracting’, ’annoying’, 
or ‘repetitive’ and some more positive view were found after task feedback such as ‘nice’, 
‘motivating’, or ‘it was good’. We found that task feedback was perceived as positive by 75% 
of the participant whereas, 20% had negative comments, and 5% gave neutral comments. 
When task feedback had been removed, 70% were positive, 25% negative, and 5% neutral. 
We found that 30% were positive to trait feedback, 45% were negative and 25% expressed 
neutral comments. In regard to when trait-feedback had been removed, 60% were positive, 
20% negative, and 20% neutral. 
4.4.6 Questionnaires 
We found a correlation between Burns depression scores and Rosenberg self-esteem scores, 
r=0.87, p=0.001, where the lower the self-esteem the more depressed. There was a significant 
interaction between mindset and feedback when looking at motivation as dependent variable, 
F(1,16)=6.040, p=0.026, two-tailed showing that motivation scores in participants with an 
entity mindset was lower (5.43±3.04) after trait-feedback (FS) than after task feedback 
(8.14±1.86), t(18)=2.03, p=0.09, two-tailed. Motivation score in participants with an 
incremental mindset did not differ between trait feedback (7.25±2.05) compared to task 
feedback (6.91±2.15), t(18)=0.87, p=0.40, two-tailed. We found no other effects of the 
questionnaires on RT, accuracy or motivation. 
4.4.7 Brain activations 
4.4.7.1 Anticipation of trait versus task feedback  
Bilateral caudate nucleus activity was increased for bivalent trials compared to univalent 
trials at the time when seeing the rule symbol ([12 8 -4], t=7.62, [-14 6 0], t=7.62, p<0.05 
FWE corrected, whole brain). When looking at bivalent compared to univalent rule symbols 
in the trait condition compared to task condition we found that left anterior caudate nucleus 
was more activated. Left caudate nucleus activity was increased when analysing a one-way 
interaction analysis between rule (bivalent > univalent) and condition (trait > task) ([-22 18 -
12] t=5.09, p<0.05 FWE whole brain corrected) and right caudate nucleus was found for the 
cross over interaction ([24 20 18], t=5.39, p<0.05, FWE whole brain corrected). 
4.4.7.2 Receiving the feedback 
At the time of seeing the feedback, there was no activation surviving the conservative 
statistical threshold of correcting for multiple comparisons in the whole brain. We observe 
that at the threshold p<0.001 uncorrected, there was more activity when seeing the feedback 
‘you are clever’ as compared to ‘your choice was correct’ for both bivalent and univalent 
trials. See table in paper IV.  
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4.4.7.3 Paracingulate cortex activation in feedback and no feedback session 
We had a hypothesis about seeing more activity in paracingulate cortex, the area located 
between the ACC and the anterior frontal pole e.g. in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex 
during the trait feedback condition (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Bengtsson et al., 2011; 
Bengtsson, Lau, & Passingham, 2009). When seeing the rule symbol during in the (FS) trait 
condition we found a main effect of trait > task feedback activation in the anterior 
paracingulate cortex 4-mm sphere ([12 52 28], t=2.46, p<0.05 small volume corrected (SVC), 
([12 54 26], t=2.59 p<0.06, 6-mm).  
Seeing the bivalent rule symbol during the no feedback session (NFS) when previously 
having seen the trait feedback also evoked increased paracingulate cortex activity in  a 6-mm 
sphere, for the interaction (bivalent > univalent) and condition (trait > task) ([6 50 26], 
t=2.76, p<0.05, SVC). This was also found in the contrast; trait bivalent rule vs. trait 
univalent rule ([6 50 28], t=3.08, p<0.05, SVC).   
We found that there was a significant positive correlation between BOLD and performance 
accuracy at the event of seeing the bivalent rule symbol, in the no feedback condition 
following the condition with the task feedback (16 50 30, t=4.26, p<0.008 Bonferroni 
corrected). 
4.4.8 Short discussion study IV 
We found different effects of trait feedback i.e., ‘you are clever’ compared to action/task 
feedback i.e., ‘your choice was correct’, on motivation, accuracy improvements, stress and 
brain activations. Trait feedback reduced motivation, increased stress and lead to less 
accuracy improvements compared to task feedback. During the trait feedback session we 
found increased caudate activation compared to task feedback during anticipation when 
having seen the rule symbol. We found increased activation in trait feedback sessions 
compared to task feedback sessions in paracingulate cortex, in line with our prior hypothesis. 
We also found increased paracingulum activity in the condition without feedback following 
the task feedback session. 
4.4.8.1 Previous research of anticipation of rewards 
The caudate nucleus has previously been found during anticipation and of wanting a reward 
in several studies on humans (Berridge, 2007; Aharon, Kahneman, & Shizgal, 2001; Hajcak 
& Simons, 2002; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; O’Doherty, Critchley, 
Deichmann, & Dolan, 2003). When participants can win or lose money in a task depending 
on their action, caudate nucleus is activated when they anticipate a reward with uncertainty to 
whether their action will lead to the desired outcome or not (Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 
2004). Tricomi et al., (2004) argued that caudate nucleus is more associated with the 
anticipations of secondary rewards such as winning money or making a correct response, 
whereas nucleus accumbens seem more activated by anticipations of primary reward, such as 
when later getting to drink a juice. They investigated the link between anticipation of positive 
feedback related to participants’ own actions arguing that the participants’ later action is 
required to elicit the anticipatory activity of the caudate nucleus. 
4.4.8.2 Caudate activity in the current study  
In our results of study IV, we found increased activation during anticipation on bivalent rule 
symbols compared to univalent symbols in the caudate, in line with the results of Tricomi et 
al., (2004). This activation may reflect that the participant starts to anticipate the upcoming 
cue symbol with uncertainty. This uncertainty may be related to thoughts about which symbol 
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will be next and what to respond in order to receive the rewarding feedback. In line with this 
argument, our result showed increased activity in the caudate during bivalent rule symbols in 
particular due to greater uncertainty of the upcoming symbol.  
We found less caudate activity on univalent trials. Univalent trials are easy and have a fixed 
outcome. Thus, participants are probably more certain when seeing this type of rule symbol. 
When seeing the next symbol, participants now will know what to press in order to receive 
the feedback that will follow a correct choice without having to remember the first symbol. If 
it was a bivalent trial, the participant would on the other hand have to remember the rule 
symbol in order to connect the two to perform the correct button press. Behavioural data also 
showed that univalent trials were much easier than bivalent trials. 
4.4.8.3 Task and trait feedback 
In the sessions where the feedback sentence ‘you are clever’ was delivered at correct choices, 
participants had increased caudate activity at the time of seeing the bivalent rule symbols 
compared to the sessions when ‘your choice was correct’ was used.  
Making associations to intelligence seem to have an enhanced impact on the participants’ 
confidence compared to thoughts regarding making a correct choice.  The feedback ‘you are 
clever’ relates to a person’s character, and as found in the debriefing, some but not all, 
participants found this feedback to be annoying, disturbing or even ironic in a task like this. 
When participants were anticipating ‘you are clever’ they may have felt a higher level of 
uncertainty regarding their future actions and outcomes and during this session they may 
possibly have felt that there was more at stake, compared to the session with the feedback; 
‘your choice was correct’. This may have strengthened their anticipation during the rule 
symbol. As the behavioural results showed, trait feedback did lead to slightly less 
improvement and participants were also found to be less motivated to continue after this 
session. 
Furthermore, in the session with the feedback ‘you are clever’, we found more activity in the 
brain in general. It may be related to that the trait feedback sentence need to be translated into 
‘correct’ whereas in the task feedback session, participants are given the direct message of 
choosing correctly which does not need further translation and participants can instead focus 
their full attention to the task, which is beneficial for full focus on the task. 
4.4.8.4 Activity at the time when receiving the feedback 
Anticipating feedback have been found to differ from receiving the feedback (Herwig, 
Kaffenberger, Baumgartner, & Jäncke, 2007; Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, MacKiewicz, Schaefer, 
& Davidson, 2006; O’Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002). In a study by 
O’Doherty et al., (2002), they found midbrain, posterior dorsal amygdala and striatum 
activations when people expected a taste reward but these areas were not found when 
receiving the reward itself. In our study, did not find caudate activation increase at the time 
when receiving the feedback in either task or trait feedback session. This indicates that the 
reward was expected (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000) possibly already at the time when seeing 
the first symbol for univalent trials and at the second symbol for bivalent trials. 
4.4.8.5 Paracingulate activity during anticipation 
We found increased activity in the paracingulate cortex in the trait compared to the task 
feedback session when seeing the rule symbol. This activity may reflect self-reflection on 
cleverness such as (Am I smart/stupid?). Interestingly, we also found paracingulate cortex 
activity in the silent condition following the task feedback session at the time when seeing the 
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rule symbol. This activity correlated with performance accuracy. This internally evoked self-
reflection following the task feedback session, can be related to choosing 
correctly/incorrectly, which seem to have benefitted performance monitoring. On the other 
hand, paracingulate activity evoked during the session with trait feedback session, may relate 
to self-reflection about one’s intelligence, which was not beneficial performance. 
4.4.9 Limitations and future direction 
From this study, brain activation patterns together with the behaviour results give us an 
indication that trait feedback seems less beneficial.  
We used subjective measures of stress and difficulty where the participants had to tell the 
experimenter their ratings. It would have been interesting to also use an objective measures 
such as cortisol and heart rate to measure their stress level. 
This task was easy for the participants. Having a more complex task with different levels of 
difficulty would have been valuable in order to investigate the effect of feedback depending 
on task difficulty. In a more difficult task, we could also have studied the reactions to errors 
depending on the type of praise given in the two conditions. Furthermore, with a larger 
sample, we could also have looked into the participants’ entity or incremental mindset in 
relation to their mistakes in the trait and task sessions. 
5 OVERALL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The overall aim of this thesis named; Error, Praise, Action and Trait, was to investigate the 
effects of trial-based feedback and anticipations on performance accuracy and motivation in 
cognitive-tasks such as WM-tasks and a rule-switching task.  
External input can grasp our attention. The disadvantage of attending to feedback is that the 
feedback itself can use up our attentional resources that could otherwise be spent on the 
actual task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). When an individual is focusing on a task, activity 
increases in areas needed for that particular task and a decrease in activity has been found in 
the posterior cingulate, precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). This network is 
instead  increased when a person is in a resting state (Fransson, 2006; Raichle et al., 2001).  
In our studies, we have demonstrated that feedback can be used to direct attention. More 
specifically, studies I and III illustrate that feedback frequency matters for performance. In 
study I, we found that too much external trial-based feedback on a WM task was not good for 
performance accuracy. In study III, in which we tested trial-based feedback on students in a 
school environment, we replicated the finding from study I. Students were found to improve 
less in a WM training program when both positive and negative feedback was given, 
compared to other groups receiving only positive or no feedback. These two studies point in 
the same direction showing that feedback on all trials, both errors and corrects, hampers 
performance, see summary figure 23. When external feedback on errors and correct responses 
is given, it is possible that attention is drawn towards the external input and away from the 
internal task monitoring, which reduces performance.  
One attention grasping mechanism described in previous research is when there is a change 
of auditory sounds in a sequence (Sörqvist, 2010). This may be the reason why we in studies 
I and III found that the combination of correct and incorrect sounds were particularly 
distracting for the individuals’ cognitive performance in WM tasks. This effect of distractions 
by task irrelevant sounds on performance (Sörqvist et al., 2012) is an important issue to take 
into account when designing tasks using feedback with sounds that aim to be helpful rather 
than distracting.  
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The results from study III in particular can be used to try to improve computerized pedagogic 
tools such the feedback used in WM training software. Moreover, it would be of great interest 
to use the same setup as in study III, with feedback groups, to test on individuals with 
ADHD. The effects of positive feedback alone and distractions of positive and negative 
feedback combined may play an even bigger role, when the attentional control is lower, 
which needs to be tested.  
The will to perform well and the fear of failure can become a hindrance in everyday life. For 
example, people who have a self-esteem based on results e.g. a performance-based self-
esteem, burnouts are common (Dahlin et al., 2007). Moreover, ascribing one’s own value to 
accomplishments have been linked to increase drop-outs from schools (Vallerand, Fortier, & 
Guay, 1997). In Study II of this thesis, performed in schools, we investigated factors 
influencing persistence and dropouts from a demanding WM training program. We found that 
students’ motivation and way of thinking about intelligence influenced the number of trained 
sessions. A growth mindset, high beliefs about the usefulness of the task and a student’s 
strong belief of being able to complete the training were factors that correlated positively with 
trained sessions. This is in line with previous work (Blackwell et al., 2007; Mueller & 
Dweck, 1998) where students with a growth mindset showed increased motivation. The 
results also fit well with Bandura’s (1993) description of self-efficacy and of the importance 
of having a goal and a purpose for a task, as explained by Ryan & Deci (2000). It is of great 
educational value to better understand the effects of prior expectations before starting a task 
or program, since these expectations have great impact on improvements and persistence.  
We found a correlation with low self-esteem and depression scores in study IV. However, a 
high view of oneself does not have to influence performance or effort in a positive direction 
(Baumeister et al., 2003). This is of importance to study further since the relation between 
self-view and performance is complex. For example, in Study III we did not find correlations 
between a person’s strong belief of being good at an upcoming task and more effort when the 
task started. Starting a challenging training program with the belief that the task will be easy 
and that one will do well was not beneficial when looking at the effort measure. One 
explanation of this may be that these high expectations on performance were not met in the 
training. If the task presented a greater challenge than expected, it is possible that the 
individuals were influenced by fixed thoughts, such as; ‘I’m no good at this task’. These 
kinds of thoughts may have influenced the individual’s effort and the urge to give up which 
would be of interest to test in future experiments. 
In study III we took the concept of effort and motivation one step further by analysing a new 
measure, effort score. The effort scores correlated positively with high intrinsic motivation 
(figure 23) indicating that this measure of effort can be used as a complement to the 
questionnaires, which should be further evaluated in future studies to better understand the 
aspects of effort. 
Kluger & DeNisi, (1996) suggested that feedback is not always beneficial for improving 
achievements. In the thorough review by Hattie & Timperley, (2007), on the educational 
aspects of feedback, they discuss why feedback is not always beneficial. They argue that 
person related feedback such as “you are fantastic” or ‘you are an idiot’ do not consist of 
information that informs the participant about the task and how to change strategy to improve 
and therefore this type of feedback does not enhance self-efficacy. A focus on oneself rather 
than the task may lead to assigning the performance outcome to one’s character rather than to 
the actions. There are studies suggesting that associations to things unrelated to the task 
influence where our attention is directed (Guinote, 2007). If feedback involves something 
self-related it may therefore direct attention to oneself instead of to the task (Butler, 1987; 
Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Interestingly, the processing efficiency theory by Eysenck and 
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Calvo (1992) depict that anxiety can take up peoples’ attention but can also work a drive to 
increase effort in order to perform well.  
Actions can be changed but one’s characteristics are viewed as fixed, as described by Dweck, 
(1986). Inspired by the work of Dweck and colleagues, especially the study by Gunderson et 
al., (2013), on long-term effect of action and trait feedback, we decided to use the two types 
of positive feedback or praise in an imaging study. Our results in study IV imply that action 
and trait feedback also had short-term effects, reflected in different brain activations and 
behavioural measures. When feedback related to an action rather than a trait, it seems to be 
better for both motivation and improvements.  
 
Figure 23. Summary of some of the major results of the studies included in the thesis regarding feedback (FB), 
mindset and motivation on working memory (WM) accuracy. 
Another important aspect that has been addressed in this thesis is how to adjust the difficulty 
level in a task. The level of difficulty has also been described to influence the level of which 
feedback sounds work as distractions (Halin et al., 2014). It would be of interest to study 
these effects also in a more difficult task, which would give the opportunity to also look at 
errors. Furthermore, for future studies, with a larger sample, and a more difficult task, we can 
investigate the effects of trait and task feedback on errors and if these reactions differ among 
people with a growth or fixed mindset. 
One aspect that was only touched upon in study III was the student-teacher relationship and 
how this influences motivation and performance. A teacher’s expectations on their students 
has been shown to influence students’ performance (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). 
Furthermore, the way of teaching can have a lot of impact on the students’ motivation (Rattan 
et al., 2012; Reeve, J., Boilt E., Cai, 1999). In study III, we found that the impact of coaching 
was a factor influencing training compliance but we did not have enough information 
regarding the coaching to understand the effects. For future studies, it would be of interest to 
standardize the coach protocols and use coach evaluations to better understand the role of 
coaches for persistence in WM training program.  
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The research done on how we react to setbacks and mistakes relates to the clinical condition 
of having a hyperactive error-monitoring system found in people diagnosed with OCD 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2005; Huyser, Veltman, Wolters, de Haan, & Boer, 2011). Moreover, this 
strong reaction to mistakes is also found in students who score high on conscientiousness 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2005; Hajcak & Simons, 2002). It would for future studies be interesting to 
analyse how expectations play a role in handling mistakes and if we can via feedback and 
expectations influence these reactions, so that these reactions do not impede daily life.  
In the future, I hope to find more studies on how feedback and expectations can influence 
training and motivation. This way we can develop computerized learning games and teaching 
strategies that can be put into practice to increase individuals own will to learn and improve.  
 
Don’t be disappointed with yourself 
for not knowing things 
before you learned about them 
but give yourself and others  
the feedback needed 
in order to learn 
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